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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 16:52:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-271170</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-271170</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-271170</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-271170</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-22728</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22728</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original &amp;#34;strict&amp;#34; or
&amp;#34;namespace-wide&amp;#34; constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original &amp;#34;strict&amp;#34; or
&amp;#34;namespace-wide&amp;#34; constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22728</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj — Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untruste…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-465p-v42x-3fmj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Relevant Links (Pinned)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606
- Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) an…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Relevant Links (Pinned)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606
- Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) an…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-465p-v42x-3fmj</guid>
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