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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:39:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-265686</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265686</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-265686</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265686</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-22686</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22686</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to 2.7.0, there is a critical sandbox escape vulnerability in enclave-vm that allows untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript code to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime. When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor. An attacker can intentionally trigger a host error, then climb the prototype chain. Using the host Function constructor, arbitrary JavaScript can be compiled and executed in the host context, fully bypassing the sandbox and granting access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network. This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to 2.7.0, there is a critical sandbox escape vulnerability in enclave-vm that allows untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript code to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime. When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor. An attacker can intentionally trigger a host error, then climb the prototype chain. Using the host Function constructor, arbitrary JavaScript can be compiled and executed in the host context, fully bypassing the sandbox and granting access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network. This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22686</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 — enclave-vm Vulnerable to Sandbox Escape via Host Error Prototype Chain</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7qm7-455j-5p63</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: enclave-vm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in **enclave-vm** (affected: **&amp;lt; 2.6.0**, patched: **2.7.0**) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the **host Node.js runtime**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a **host-side Error object** to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its **host realm prototype chain**, which can be traversed to reach the **host `Function` constructor**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With access to the host `Function` constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as `process.env`, filesystem, and network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**FrontMCP** is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the **CodeCall plugin** enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall** (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP **CodeCall** for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Live Playground (Safe Exploration &amp;amp; Testing)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and vali…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: enclave-vm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in **enclave-vm** (affected: **&amp;lt; 2.6.0**, patched: **2.7.0**) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the **host Node.js runtime**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a **host-side Error object** to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its **host realm prototype chain**, which can be traversed to reach the **host `Function` constructor**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With access to the host `Function` constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as `process.env`, filesystem, and network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**FrontMCP** is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the **CodeCall plugin** enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall** (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP **CodeCall** for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Live Playground (Safe Exploration &amp;amp; Testing)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and vali…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7qm7-455j-5p63</guid>
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