https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 17:44:44 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265236 EUVD-2026-265236 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265236 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22588 <p>Spree is an open source e-commerce solution built with Ruby on Rails. Prior to versions 4.10.2, 5.0.7, 5.1.9, and 5.2.5, an Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response. This issue has been patched in versions 4.10.2, 5.0.7, 5.1.9, and 5.2.5.</p> <p>Spree is an open source e-commerce solution built with Ruby on Rails. Prior to versions 4.10.2, 5.0.7, 5.1.9, and 5.2.5, an Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response. This issue has been patched in versions 4.10.2, 5.0.7, 5.1.9, and 5.2.5.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22588 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g268-72p7-9j6j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: spree_api</p> <p>### Summary An Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response.</p> <p>### Details Affected Component(s) - Authenticated user order management - Address association logic - Order update endpoint(s) Affected Endpoint(s): - `/api/v2/storefront/checkout`</p> <p>The application fails to enforce proper object-level authorization when updating an existing order. While the user is authenticated and authorized to modify their own order, the backend does not verify that the supplied address identifiers belong to the same authenticated user.</p> <p>### PoC Preconditions - Valid authenticated user account</p> <p>Step 1: Log-in using a valid user, in this case customer2@example.com Step 2: Visualize current user’s addresses</p> <p>**Request** GET `/account/addresses`</p> <p>The following screenshot shows customer2@example.com address.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;336&#34; height=&#34;375&#34; alt=&#34;User Address&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ceb1f214-7ac0-40b0-af22-6fe9d21254bb&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>Step 3: Initialize the Shopping Cart</p> <p>**Request** POST `/api/v2/storefront/cart HTTP/1.1`</p> <p>From the response, extract the to…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: spree_api</p> <p>### Summary An Authenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified that allows an authenticated user to retrieve other users’ address information by modifying an existing order. By editing an order they legitimately own and manipulating address identifiers in the request, the backend server accepts and processes references to addresses belonging to other users, subsequently associating those addresses with the attacker’s order and returning them in the response.</p> <p>### Details Affected Component(s) - Authenticated user order management - Address association logic - Order update endpoint(s) Affected Endpoint(s): - `/api/v2/storefront/checkout`</p> <p>The application fails to enforce proper object-level authorization when updating an existing order. While the user is authenticated and authorized to modify their own order, the backend does not verify that the supplied address identifiers belong to the same authenticated user.</p> <p>### PoC Preconditions - Valid authenticated user account</p> <p>Step 1: Log-in using a valid user, in this case customer2@example.com Step 2: Visualize current user’s addresses</p> <p>**Request** GET `/account/addresses`</p> <p>The following screenshot shows customer2@example.com address.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;336&#34; height=&#34;375&#34; alt=&#34;User Address&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ceb1f214-7ac0-40b0-af22-6fe9d21254bb&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>Step 3: Initialize the Shopping Cart</p> <p>**Request** POST `/api/v2/storefront/cart HTTP/1.1`</p> <p>From the response, extract the to…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g268-72p7-9j6j