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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:27:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-266410</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266410</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-266410</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266410</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-20613</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-20613</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. This issue is addressed in container 0.8.0 and containerization 0.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. This issue is addressed in container 0.8.0 and containerization 0.21.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-20613</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 — Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SwiftURL: github.com/apple/containerization, SwiftURL: github.com/apple/container&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ArchiveReader.extractContents()` function used by `cctl image load` and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```swift
    /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory.
    /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive.
    public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws {
        let fm = FileManager.default
        var foundEntry = false
        for (entry, data) in self {
            guard let p = entry.path else { continue }
            foundEntry = true
            let type = entry.fileType
            let target = directory.appending(path: p)
            switch type {
            case .regular:
                try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic)
            case .directory:
                try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
            case .symbolicLink:
                guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else {
                    continue
                }
                try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationUR…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SwiftURL: github.com/apple/containerization, SwiftURL: github.com/apple/container&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ArchiveReader.extractContents()` function used by `cctl image load` and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```swift
    /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory.
    /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive.
    public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws {
        let fm = FileManager.default
        var foundEntry = false
        for (entry, data) in self {
            guard let p = entry.path else { continue }
            foundEntry = true
            let type = entry.fileType
            let target = directory.appending(path: p)
            switch type {
            case .regular:
                try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic)
            case .directory:
                try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
            case .symbolicLink:
                guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else {
                    continue
                }
                try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationUR…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3</guid>
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