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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-349710</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349710</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-349710</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349710</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-14224</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14224</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment&amp;#39;s edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user&amp;#39;s appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 then treats that metadata as the appointment&amp;#39;s contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim&amp;#39;s appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment&amp;#39;s edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user&amp;#39;s appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 then treats that metadata as the appointment&amp;#39;s contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim&amp;#39;s appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14224</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hqv9-x7qp-69hr</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hqv9-x7qp-69hr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment&amp;#39;s edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user&amp;#39;s appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 then treats that metadata as the appointment&amp;#39;s contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim&amp;#39;s appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment&amp;#39;s edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user&amp;#39;s appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 then treats that metadata as the appointment&amp;#39;s contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim&amp;#39;s appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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