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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 16:11:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-408865</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408865</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-408865</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408865</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-130008</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-130008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;sqlite-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for SQLite. Prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through execute_query, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describe_table, which interpolates the caller-controlled table_name into PRAGMA table_info. Either path can issue ATTACH DATABASE, which opens an attached file read-write despite mode=ro and can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a path writable by the server process. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged. The server has no built-in authentication and listens on all interfaces at :8080 by default, so any client that can reach the port can invoke these tools unless an authenticating proxy is in place. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;sqlite-mcp is a Model Context Protocol server for SQLite. Prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through execute_query, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describe_table, which interpolates the caller-controlled table_name into PRAGMA table_info. Either path can issue ATTACH DATABASE, which opens an attached file read-write despite mode=ro and can make the protected database writable, read other SQLite database files, or create a SQLite-format file at a path writable by the server process. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged. The server has no built-in authentication and listens on all interfaces at :8080 by default, so any client that can reach the port can invoke these tools unless an authenticating proxy is in place. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-130008</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f — sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q433-mp6c-8v4f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through `execute_query`, and SQL injection through `describe_table`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Statement chaining in `execute_query`.** The only check was that the query starts with `SELECT`. The `modernc.org/sqlite` driver runs every `;`-separated statement in one call, so anything after `SELECT 1;` ran unchecked.
- **SQL injection in `describe_table`.** The `table_name` argument was interpolated into `PRAGMA table_info(%s)` with no guard.
- **Escaping read-only mode.** Through either path, `ATTACH DATABASE` opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection&amp;#39;s `mode=ro`. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from `ATTACH` reaching files other than the configured database.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The server has no built-in…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through `execute_query`, and SQL injection through `describe_table`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Statement chaining in `execute_query`.** The only check was that the query starts with `SELECT`. The `modernc.org/sqlite` driver runs every `;`-separated statement in one call, so anything after `SELECT 1;` ran unchecked.
- **SQL injection in `describe_table`.** The `table_name` argument was interpolated into `PRAGMA table_info(%s)` with no guard.
- **Escaping read-only mode.** Through either path, `ATTACH DATABASE` opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection&amp;#39;s `mode=ro`. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from `ATTACH` reaching files other than the configured database.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The server has no built-in…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q433-mp6c-8v4f</guid>
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