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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407000</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407000</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407000</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407000</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr — qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vx32-xf7g-9ghr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected repository:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable extraction code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s&amp;#34;, targetPath, destdirClean)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
cas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected repository:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable extraction code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s&amp;#34;, targetPath, destdirClean)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
cas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vx32-xf7g-9ghr</guid>
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