https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 10:25:49 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331581 EUVD-2026-331581 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331581 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12904 <p>The Kadence Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks for Page Builder Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to and including 3.7.7. This is due to a mismatch between the object used for authorization and the object actually accessed in the Optimize_Rest_Controller&#39;s create_item(), get_item(), delete_item(), and bulk_delete_items() endpoints — authorization is checked via current_user_can(&#39;edit_post&#39;/&#39;delete_post&#39;, $post_id) against the user-supplied post_id, while the storage layer keys analysis records on sha256($post_path) from a separately supplied, attacker-controlled post_path parameter, with no enforcement that post_path corresponds to post_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read or delete optimizer analysis records belonging to posts owned by other users by submitting their own post_id (which passes the capability check) together with the victim post&#39;s path.</p> <p>The Kadence Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks for Page Builder Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to and including 3.7.7. This is due to a mismatch between the object used for authorization and the object actually accessed in the Optimize_Rest_Controller&#39;s create_item(), get_item(), delete_item(), and bulk_delete_items() endpoints — authorization is checked via current_user_can(&#39;edit_post&#39;/&#39;delete_post&#39;, $post_id) against the user-supplied post_id, while the storage layer keys analysis records on sha256($post_path) from a separately supplied, attacker-controlled post_path parameter, with no enforcement that post_path corresponds to post_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read or delete optimizer analysis records belonging to posts owned by other users by submitting their own post_id (which passes the capability check) together with the victim post&#39;s path.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12904 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjfr-44xr-rrw5 <p>The Kadence Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks for Page Builder Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to and including 3.7.7. This is due to a mismatch between the object used for authorization and the object actually accessed in the Optimize_Rest_Controller&#39;s create_item(), get_item(), delete_item(), and bulk_delete_items() endpoints — authorization is checked via current_user_can(&#39;edit_post&#39;/&#39;delete_post&#39;, $post_id) against the user-supplied post_id, while the storage layer keys analysis records on sha256($post_path) from a separately supplied, attacker-controlled post_path parameter, with no enforcement that post_path corresponds to post_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read or delete optimizer analysis records belonging to posts owned by other users by submitting their own post_id (which passes the capability check) together with the victim post&#39;s path.</p> <p>The Kadence Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks for Page Builder Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to and including 3.7.7. This is due to a mismatch between the object used for authorization and the object actually accessed in the Optimize_Rest_Controller&#39;s create_item(), get_item(), delete_item(), and bulk_delete_items() endpoints — authorization is checked via current_user_can(&#39;edit_post&#39;/&#39;delete_post&#39;, $post_id) against the user-supplied post_id, while the storage layer keys analysis records on sha256($post_path) from a separately supplied, attacker-controlled post_path parameter, with no enforcement that post_path corresponds to post_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read or delete optimizer analysis records belonging to posts owned by other users by submitting their own post_id (which passes the capability check) together with the victim post&#39;s path.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjfr-44xr-rrw5