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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-406511</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406511</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-406511</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406511</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9264-jvgf-6w2f — russh kex_done: Shared-secret callback runs before server host-key verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9264-jvgf-6w2f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh&amp;#39;s `client::Handler::kex_done()` callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls `check_server_key()` and rejects the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the initial key exchange, russh calls `kex_done()` immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();
handler
    .kex_done(shared_secret, &amp;amp;newkeys.names, session)
    .await?;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.
if let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {
    if !handler.check_server_key(&amp;amp;certificate.into()).await? {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {
    let check = handler.check_server_key(&amp;amp;server_host_key.into()).await?;
    if !check {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is in `russh/src/client/mod.rs` at lines 2036-2078 of commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The API documentation describes `check_server_key()` as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes `kex_done()` as the callback…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh&amp;#39;s `client::Handler::kex_done()` callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls `check_server_key()` and rejects the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the initial key exchange, russh calls `kex_done()` immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();
handler
    .kex_done(shared_secret, &amp;amp;newkeys.names, session)
    .await?;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.
if let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {
    if !handler.check_server_key(&amp;amp;certificate.into()).await? {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {
    let check = handler.check_server_key(&amp;amp;server_host_key.into()).await?;
    if !check {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is in `russh/src/client/mod.rs` at lines 2036-2078 of commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The API documentation describes `check_server_key()` as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes `kex_done()` as the callback…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9264-jvgf-6w2f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-128087</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128087</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From version 0.55.0 until version 0.65.1, the initial key exchange invokes client::Handler::kex_done() with the raw shared secret before check_server_key() accepts the server host key or certificate. A malicious SSH server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel initialization or early data handling even when the server identity is subsequently rejected. Ordinary clients that keep the callback&amp;#39;s no-op default or independently defer callback-derived actions until trust is confirmed are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From version 0.55.0 until version 0.65.1, the initial key exchange invokes client::Handler::kex_done() with the raw shared secret before check_server_key() accepts the server host key or certificate. A malicious SSH server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel initialization or early data handling even when the server identity is subsequently rejected. Ordinary clients that keep the callback&amp;#39;s no-op default or independently defer callback-derived actions until trust is confirmed are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128087</guid>
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