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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-407412</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407412</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407412</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407412</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-128073</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-128073</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;gosaml2 is a Pure Go implementation of SAML 2.0. Prior to 0.12.0, ValidateEncodedResponse() calls decryptAssertions() on an EncryptedAssertion before signature or content validation completes, and EncryptedAssertion.DecryptBytes() in types/encrypted_assertion.go slices decoded ciphertext without first validating the required nonce or initialization-vector length. A CipherValue shorter than the 12-byte AES-GCM nonce causes a slice-bounds panic, and an empty AES-CBC CipherValue passes the modulo block-size check before causing a slice-bounds panic at the 16-byte initialization-vector split. An attacker needs only the service provider&amp;#39;s public certificate to wrap a symmetric key, and no valid identity-provider signature or relationship is required. The unrecovered panic can terminate the request goroutine or the service process. This issue is fixed in version 0.12.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;gosaml2 is a Pure Go implementation of SAML 2.0. Prior to 0.12.0, ValidateEncodedResponse() calls decryptAssertions() on an EncryptedAssertion before signature or content validation completes, and EncryptedAssertion.DecryptBytes() in types/encrypted_assertion.go slices decoded ciphertext without first validating the required nonce or initialization-vector length. A CipherValue shorter than the 12-byte AES-GCM nonce causes a slice-bounds panic, and an empty AES-CBC CipherValue passes the modulo block-size check before causing a slice-bounds panic at the 16-byte initialization-vector split. An attacker needs only the service provider&amp;#39;s public certificate to wrap a symmetric key, and no valid identity-provider signature or relationship is required. The unrecovered panic can terminate the request goroutine or the service process. This issue is fixed in version 0.12.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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