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      <title>EUVD-2026-404505</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404505</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404505</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404505</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125338</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125338</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. Prior to 1.2.14, BrandSetting::renderCss() and EditorSetting::renderCss() store raw LESS compiler output with Cache::forever() but apply strip_tags() only to the value returned on a cache miss. The first render after saving custom CSS appears sanitized while priming an unsafe cache entry, and later cache hits return unsanitized output into the backend style element, allowing a user with backend.manage_branding or backend.manage_editor to cause stored cross-site scripting when another backend page renders the styles. The styles also appear on unauthenticated backend sign-in, password restore, and password reset layouts. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. Prior to 1.2.14, BrandSetting::renderCss() and EditorSetting::renderCss() store raw LESS compiler output with Cache::forever() but apply strip_tags() only to the value returned on a cache miss. The first render after saving custom CSS appears sanitized while priming an unsafe cache entry, and later cache hits return unsanitized output into the backend style element, allowing a user with backend.manage_branding or backend.manage_editor to cause stored cross-site scripting when another backend page renders the styles. The styles also appear on unauthenticated backend sign-in, password restore, and password reset layouts. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125338</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-5cwr-5jxg-pcf6 — Winter: Stored XSS through cached Brand Settings and Editor Settings custom styles</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5cwr-5jxg-pcf6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users with the `backend.manage_branding` (&amp;#34;Customize the back-end&amp;#34;) or `backend.manage_editor` (&amp;#34;Manage global code editor preferences&amp;#34;) permission can provide custom CSS through **Settings → Customize Backend → Styles** or **Settings → Editor Settings → Markup Styles** that is compiled through the LESS CSS parser and rendered on every backend page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;v1.2.13 addressed CVE-2026-32257 and CVE-2026-32258 by applying `strip_tags()` to the compiled output of `BrandSetting::renderCss()` and `EditorSetting::renderCss()`. That fix was incomplete. Both methods cache the **raw** compiler output with `Cache::forever()` and applied `strip_tags()` only to the value returned on a cache miss, so every subsequent cache hit returned the unsanitized value directly into the backend `&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;` element. The first page render after saving therefore appears sanitized while priming an unsafe cache entry, and the stored XSS remains exploitable from the second render onwards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the custom styles partial is included by both the standard backend layout head and the backend authentication layout, an injected payload also renders on the unauthenticated backend sign-in, password restore, and password reset pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is a valid security issue, it&amp;#39;s important to note that its severity is relatively low. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have trusted access to the Winter CMS backend with a specific administrative permission. The Winter CMS maintaine…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users with the `backend.manage_branding` (&amp;#34;Customize the back-end&amp;#34;) or `backend.manage_editor` (&amp;#34;Manage global code editor preferences&amp;#34;) permission can provide custom CSS through **Settings → Customize Backend → Styles** or **Settings → Editor Settings → Markup Styles** that is compiled through the LESS CSS parser and rendered on every backend page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;v1.2.13 addressed CVE-2026-32257 and CVE-2026-32258 by applying `strip_tags()` to the compiled output of `BrandSetting::renderCss()` and `EditorSetting::renderCss()`. That fix was incomplete. Both methods cache the **raw** compiler output with `Cache::forever()` and applied `strip_tags()` only to the value returned on a cache miss, so every subsequent cache hit returned the unsanitized value directly into the backend `&amp;lt;style&amp;gt;` element. The first page render after saving therefore appears sanitized while priming an unsafe cache entry, and the stored XSS remains exploitable from the second render onwards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the custom styles partial is included by both the standard backend layout head and the backend authentication layout, an injected payload also renders on the unauthenticated backend sign-in, password restore, and password reset pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although this is a valid security issue, it&amp;#39;s important to note that its severity is relatively low. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have trusted access to the Winter CMS backend with a specific administrative permission. The Winter CMS maintaine…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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