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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-402642</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402642</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-402642</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402642</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2, djust keys context output-safety grants by variable name and fails to revoke a grant when a template bind replaces the value associated with that name. A template using {% with %}, {% for %}, {% include ... with %}, tuple unpacking, or assign tags can therefore rebind a name that previously held mark_safe content and emit the new attacker-controlled value without escaping, including descendant lookups through the rebound name. This can cause stored or reflected cross-site scripting when a victim renders the affected template. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2, djust keys context output-safety grants by variable name and fails to revoke a grant when a template bind replaces the value associated with that name. A template using {% with %}, {% for %}, {% include ... with %}, tuple unpacking, or assign tags can therefore rebind a name that previously held mark_safe content and emit the new attacker-controlled value without escaping, including descendant lookups through the rebound name. This can cause stored or reflected cross-site scripting when a victim renders the affected template. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.10 and 1.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xjw9-38cr-6372 — djust: A template binding inherits a context safety grant it never earned (XSS)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xjw9-38cr-6372</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A context safety grant was inherited by a template **binding** that never earned it, so rebinding a name the view had marked safe left the mark attached to the new, attacker-controlled value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;djust&amp;#39;s context safety channel is keyed by **name**, not by value. Every bind copied the value and left the grant in place:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
view marks   p = mark_safe(&amp;#39;&amp;lt;b&amp;gt;trusted&amp;lt;/b&amp;gt;&amp;#39;)
template     {% with p=user_input %}{{ p }}{% endwith %}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;djust   &amp;#39;&amp;lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&amp;gt;&amp;#39;          &amp;lt;- executes
  django  &amp;#39;&amp;amp;lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&amp;amp;gt;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected binds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eight distinct shapes were live. All are fixed in 1.1.2:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| shape | example |
|---|---|
| `{% with %}` rebinding a marked name | `{% with p=hostile %}{{ p }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% with %}` **descendant** of a rebound name | `{% with p=hostile %}{{ p.a }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% with %}` binding over a marked name | `{% with q=hostile %}{{ q }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% for %}` loop variable | `{% for p in hostiles %}{{ p }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% for %}` descendant | `{% for p in hostiles %}{{ p.a }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% for %}` tuple unpacking | `{% for k, v in rows %}{{ v }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% include … with %}` | `{% include &amp;#34;c.html&amp;#34; with q=hostile %}` |
| assign tags | `{% … as x %}` |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No filter chain and no `|safe` anywhere in the template is required. The precondition is that the application marked *some* value safe under a name that a template later rebinds — an ordinary pattern, since a view commonly marks trusted markup saf…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A context safety grant was inherited by a template **binding** that never earned it, so rebinding a name the view had marked safe left the mark attached to the new, attacker-controlled value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;djust&amp;#39;s context safety channel is keyed by **name**, not by value. Every bind copied the value and left the grant in place:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
view marks   p = mark_safe(&amp;#39;&amp;lt;b&amp;gt;trusted&amp;lt;/b&amp;gt;&amp;#39;)
template     {% with p=user_input %}{{ p }}{% endwith %}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;djust   &amp;#39;&amp;lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&amp;gt;&amp;#39;          &amp;lt;- executes
  django  &amp;#39;&amp;amp;lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&amp;amp;gt;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected binds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eight distinct shapes were live. All are fixed in 1.1.2:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| shape | example |
|---|---|
| `{% with %}` rebinding a marked name | `{% with p=hostile %}{{ p }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% with %}` **descendant** of a rebound name | `{% with p=hostile %}{{ p.a }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% with %}` binding over a marked name | `{% with q=hostile %}{{ q }}{% endwith %}` |
| `{% for %}` loop variable | `{% for p in hostiles %}{{ p }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% for %}` descendant | `{% for p in hostiles %}{{ p.a }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% for %}` tuple unpacking | `{% for k, v in rows %}{{ v }}{% endfor %}` |
| `{% include … with %}` | `{% include &amp;#34;c.html&amp;#34; with q=hostile %}` |
| assign tags | `{% … as x %}` |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No filter chain and no `|safe` anywhere in the template is required. The precondition is that the application marked *some* value safe under a name that a template later rebinds — an ordinary pattern, since a view commonly marks trusted markup saf…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xjw9-38cr-6372</guid>
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