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EUVD-2026-330417

fkie_cve-2026-11820

A flaw was found in the community.general Ansible collection's nexmo module. The module constructs HTTP requests to the Vonage/Nexmo SMS API by encoding API credentials (api_key and api_secret) into URL query parameters and sending them via GET requests. This causes credentials to be exposed in web server access logs, proxy logs, HTTP Referer headers, and network monitoring tools, despite the Ansible argument specification marking these parameters as no_log. An attacker with access to any of these logging or monitoring points can obtain the full API credentials and gain unauthorized access to the victim's Vonage/Nexmo account.

GHSA-87gp-wmhr-wgcw

Module: plugins/modules/nexmo.py

CVSS 3.1: 6.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Issue: api_key and api_secret are declared no_log=True at the input level, but both credentials are immediately URL-encoded into a GET request as query parameters, bypassing all no_log protection.

Vulnerable Code (lines 82-93):

msg = { "api_key": module.params.get("api_key"), "api_secret": module.params.get("api_secret"), "from": module.params.get("src"), "text": module.params.get("msg"), } url = f"{NEXMO_API}?{urlencode(msg)}" response, info = fetch_url(module, url, headers=headers)

Observed Output:

https://rest.nexmo.com/sms/json?api_key=a1b2c3d4&api_secret=MyS3cr3tK3y!!&from=AnsibleBot&to=15551234567&text=Hello

Exposure Vectors:

Ansible verbose output (-vvv) logs the full request URL

Vonage/Nexmo server access logs record credentials in query string

HTTP proxies, SIEM, and network inspection tools capture the full URL

AWX/Automation Controller network debug logs

Fix: Switch to POST with credentials in the request body:

data = urlencode({"api_key": api_key, "api_secret": api_secret, "from": src, "to": number, "text": msg}) fetch_url(module, NEXMO_API, data=data, method="POST", headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})