https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:44:06 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-351081 EUVD-2026-351081 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-351081 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-11809 <p>The UpdateHub OTA client in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c contains an out-of-bounds / uninitialized-memory read in z_impl_updatehub_probe(). The probe response from the UpdateHub server is copied into a heap buffer (metadata) that is correctly NUL-terminated, but a second buffer (metadata_copy) is allocated with k_malloc (unzeroed) and filled with memcpy(metadata_copy, metadata, strlen(metadata)), which omits the terminating NUL. Everything after the copied content remains uninitialized heap.</p> <p>When the first json_obj_parse() over the array descriptor fails, the code falls back to json_obj_parse(metadata_copy, strlen(metadata_copy), ...). The strlen() call scans past the copied bytes through uninitialized heap and, if no zero byte is found before the end of the allocation, reads beyond the buffer; the resulting over-long length is then parsed as JSON. The probe payload is fully controlled by the (malicious, compromised, or — without the optional CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS — on-path) UpdateHub server, which can craft a large payload that fails the first parse to drive this path.</p> <p>The consequence is a read of uninitialized heap, with a worst case of an out-of-bounds read past the metadata_copy allocation that can fault and crash the update thread/device, producing a network-triggerable denial of service. The over-read data is consumed only internally to evaluate the update and is not returned to the attacker, so there is no direct information disclosure and no out-of-bounds writ…</p> <p>The UpdateHub OTA client in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c contains an out-of-bounds / uninitialized-memory read in z_impl_updatehub_probe(). The probe response from the UpdateHub server is copied into a heap buffer (metadata) that is correctly NUL-terminated, but a second buffer (metadata_copy) is allocated with k_malloc (unzeroed) and filled with memcpy(metadata_copy, metadata, strlen(metadata)), which omits the terminating NUL. Everything after the copied content remains uninitialized heap.</p> <p>When the first json_obj_parse() over the array descriptor fails, the code falls back to json_obj_parse(metadata_copy, strlen(metadata_copy), ...). The strlen() call scans past the copied bytes through uninitialized heap and, if no zero byte is found before the end of the allocation, reads beyond the buffer; the resulting over-long length is then parsed as JSON. The probe payload is fully controlled by the (malicious, compromised, or — without the optional CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS — on-path) UpdateHub server, which can craft a large payload that fails the first parse to drive this path.</p> <p>The consequence is a read of uninitialized heap, with a worst case of an out-of-bounds read past the metadata_copy allocation that can fault and crash the update thread/device, producing a network-triggerable denial of service. The over-read data is consumed only internally to evaluate the update and is not returned to the attacker, so there is no direct information disclosure and no out-of-bounds writ…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-11809