<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:48:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-398477</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398477</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-398477</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398477</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-116244</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116244</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user&amp;#39;s delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account&amp;#39;s ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account&amp;#39;s Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account&amp;#39;s logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin&amp;#39;s environment, which could hold another user&amp;#39;s credential cache while that user was connecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user&amp;#39;s delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account&amp;#39;s ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account&amp;#39;s Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account&amp;#39;s logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin&amp;#39;s environment, which could hold another user&amp;#39;s credential cache while that user was connecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116244</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5539-rjhp-jvgv</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5539-rjhp-jvgv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user&amp;#39;s delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account&amp;#39;s ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account&amp;#39;s Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account&amp;#39;s logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin&amp;#39;s environment, which could hold another user&amp;#39;s credential cache while that user was connecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user&amp;#39;s delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account&amp;#39;s ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account&amp;#39;s Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account&amp;#39;s logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin&amp;#39;s environment, which could hold another user&amp;#39;s credential cache while that user was connecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix points KRB5CCNAME and KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME at a file that cannot exist except while a Kerberos-authenticated user connects with Kerberos, and gives every other connection, psql and the utilities require_auth=!gss,!sspi and gssencmode=disable, checked on the final connection string. require_auth needs libpq 16 or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5539-rjhp-jvgv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4242 — pgAdmin: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4242</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in pgAdmin ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen, möglicherweise sogar Administratorrechte, zu erlangen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und offenzulegen oder Denial-of-Service-Angriffe zu starten.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in pgAdmin ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen, möglicherweise sogar Administratorrechte, zu erlangen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und offenzulegen oder Denial-of-Service-Angriffe zu starten.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4242</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
