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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 21:06:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-399796</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399796</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-399796</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399796</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-115779</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115779</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. From @effect/platform 0.1.0 until 0.97.1 and effect 4.0.0-beta.0 until 4.0.0-beta.103, the name, domain, and path fields passed to makeCookie() allow semicolon delimiters that serializeCookie() writes verbatim into Set-Cookie headers. A caller that supplies attacker-controlled values can append cookie attributes, including a broader Domain or, when the caller has not set those options itself, SameSite=None or Max-Age. Encoded cookie values and CR or LF characters remain unaffected. This can widen a cookie&amp;#39;s scope or add otherwise-unset cookie attributes. This issue is fixed in @effect/platform 0.97.1 and effect 4.0.0-beta.103.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. From @effect/platform 0.1.0 until 0.97.1 and effect 4.0.0-beta.0 until 4.0.0-beta.103, the name, domain, and path fields passed to makeCookie() allow semicolon delimiters that serializeCookie() writes verbatim into Set-Cookie headers. A caller that supplies attacker-controlled values can append cookie attributes, including a broader Domain or, when the caller has not set those options itself, SameSite=None or Max-Age. Encoded cookie values and CR or LF characters remain unaffected. This can widen a cookie&amp;#39;s scope or add otherwise-unset cookie attributes. This issue is fixed in @effect/platform 0.97.1 and effect 4.0.0-beta.103.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115779</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr — Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-chp3-j5qr-2vfr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @effect/platform, npm: effect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, a `domain` of `&amp;#34;legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld&amp;#34;` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None` or `Max-Age` when the caller has not set those options itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `value` field is unaffected: it passes through `encodeURIComponent`, which encodes `;`. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject `;`, and `serializeCookie()` now validates before writing the header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do not pass user input into `name`, `domain`, or `path`; set them from application constants.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @effect/platform, npm: effect&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, a `domain` of `&amp;#34;legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld&amp;#34;` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None` or `Max-Age` when the caller has not set those options itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `value` field is unaffected: it passes through `encodeURIComponent`, which encodes `;`. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject `;`, and `serializeCookie()` now validates before writing the header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Do not pass user input into `name`, `domain`, or `path`; set them from application constants.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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