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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 20:16:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407361</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407361</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407361</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407361</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-110782</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110782</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer&amp;#39;s metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding&amp;#39;s embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer&amp;#39;s metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding&amp;#39;s embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110782</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g — SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no e…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7hw-jx6r-756g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: simplesamlphp/saml2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx (&amp;#34;HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass&amp;#34;) was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php  (receive())
if (!$samlResponse-&amp;gt;isSigned()) {
    return $samlResponse;                         // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED
}
return $this-&amp;gt;verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata);   // only runs when signed
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* `&amp;lt;samlp:Response&amp;gt;` whose `&amp;lt;Issuer&amp;gt;` names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer&amp;#39;s** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response&amp;#39;s `&amp;lt;Issuer&amp;gt;` equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an incomplete implementation of the fix&amp;#39;s own stated goal (&amp;#34;verify signatures using IdP metadata signing…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: simplesamlphp/saml2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx (&amp;#34;HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass&amp;#34;) was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php  (receive())
if (!$samlResponse-&amp;gt;isSigned()) {
    return $samlResponse;                         // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED
}
return $this-&amp;gt;verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata);   // only runs when signed
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* `&amp;lt;samlp:Response&amp;gt;` whose `&amp;lt;Issuer&amp;gt;` names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer&amp;#39;s** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response&amp;#39;s `&amp;lt;Issuer&amp;gt;` equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an incomplete implementation of the fix&amp;#39;s own stated goal (&amp;#34;verify signatures using IdP metadata signing…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7hw-jx6r-756g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-110782</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-110782</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.10: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: simplesamlphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related fun ...)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.10: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: simplesamlphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related fun ...)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-110782</guid>
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