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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:41:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-391797</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391797</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-391797</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391797</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-108357</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108357</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. From 3.3.0 until 3.10.8 and 5.10.0, Reader\Xml passes stored SpreadsheetML XML through XmlScanner::scan in Xml::canRead and Xml::trySimpleXMLLoadStringPrivate, while Xml::unentity decodes numeric entities only after each DOCTYPE pattern check. A double-encoded less-than character is reduced by the first callback to another encoded character and by the second callback to a literal less-than sign, so SimpleXML receives an unchecked DOCTYPE and entity declaration. Processing attacker-controlled SpreadsheetML XML can cause entity-expansion denial of service and can permit local file access or SSRF on PHP before 8.0 or when LIBXML_NOENT is enabled. This issue is fixed in versions 3.10.8 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. From 3.3.0 until 3.10.8 and 5.10.0, Reader\Xml passes stored SpreadsheetML XML through XmlScanner::scan in Xml::canRead and Xml::trySimpleXMLLoadStringPrivate, while Xml::unentity decodes numeric entities only after each DOCTYPE pattern check. A double-encoded less-than character is reduced by the first callback to another encoded character and by the second callback to a literal less-than sign, so SimpleXML receives an unchecked DOCTYPE and entity declaration. Processing attacker-controlled SpreadsheetML XML can cause entity-expansion denial of service and can permit local file access or SSRF on PHP before 8.0 or when LIBXML_NOENT is enabled. This issue is fixed in versions 3.10.8 and 5.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108357</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rxj4-h86g-25gc — PhpSpreadsheet: XmlScanner Bypass via Double-Encoded unentity() TOCTOU Allows XXE and Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rxj4-h86g-25gc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (`Reader\Xml`) scans file content **twice** through `XmlScanner::scan()`, and each scan runs an `unentity()` callback that calls `html_entity_decode()` **after** the pattern check. By double-encoding the `&amp;lt;` character as `&amp;amp;#38;#60;`, the first scan decodes `&amp;amp;#38;` to `&amp;amp;` (forming `&amp;amp;#60;`), and the second scan decodes `&amp;amp;#60;` to `&amp;lt;` (forming `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE`). Neither scan&amp;#39;s pattern check detects the `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE` string because the callback runs after each check. This enables Denial of Service via entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP &amp;lt; 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability involves an interaction between three code locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. `XmlScanner::scan()`** (XmlScanner.php, lines 87–108) — checks the pattern *before* the callback:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function scan($xml): string
{
    $pattern = &amp;#39;/\0*&amp;lt;\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*...\0*/&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) {       // CHECK 1 (raw)
        throw new Exception(&amp;#39;Detected use of ENTITY...&amp;#39;);
    }
    $xml = $this-&amp;gt;toUtf8($xml);
    if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) {       // CHECK 2 (UTF-8)
        throw new Exception(&amp;#39;Detected use of ENTITY...&amp;#39;);
    }
    if ($this-&amp;gt;callback !== null) {
        $xml = call_user_func($this-&amp;gt;callback, $xml); // DECODE (after checks!)
    }
    return $xml;  // &amp;lt;!DOCTYPE now present, never checked
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. `Xml::canRead()`** (Xml.php, lines 79–117) — scans and stores the result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$data = file_get_conte…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (`Reader\Xml`) scans file content **twice** through `XmlScanner::scan()`, and each scan runs an `unentity()` callback that calls `html_entity_decode()` **after** the pattern check. By double-encoding the `&amp;lt;` character as `&amp;amp;#38;#60;`, the first scan decodes `&amp;amp;#38;` to `&amp;amp;` (forming `&amp;amp;#60;`), and the second scan decodes `&amp;amp;#60;` to `&amp;lt;` (forming `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE`). Neither scan&amp;#39;s pattern check detects the `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE` string because the callback runs after each check. This enables Denial of Service via entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP &amp;lt; 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability involves an interaction between three code locations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. `XmlScanner::scan()`** (XmlScanner.php, lines 87–108) — checks the pattern *before* the callback:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function scan($xml): string
{
    $pattern = &amp;#39;/\0*&amp;lt;\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*...\0*/&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) {       // CHECK 1 (raw)
        throw new Exception(&amp;#39;Detected use of ENTITY...&amp;#39;);
    }
    $xml = $this-&amp;gt;toUtf8($xml);
    if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) {       // CHECK 2 (UTF-8)
        throw new Exception(&amp;#39;Detected use of ENTITY...&amp;#39;);
    }
    if ($this-&amp;gt;callback !== null) {
        $xml = call_user_func($this-&amp;gt;callback, $xml); // DECODE (after checks!)
    }
    return $xml;  // &amp;lt;!DOCTYPE now present, never checked
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. `Xml::canRead()`** (Xml.php, lines 79–117) — scans and stores the result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$data = file_get_conte…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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