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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 13:15:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-401296</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401296</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-401296</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401296</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-108262</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108262</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;DDEV is an open-source tool for running local web development environments for PHP and Node.js. From 1.25.2 until 1.25.4, Untar in pkg/archive/archive.go validates an absolute tar symlink target after rebasing it beneath dest, but creates the symlink with the raw absolute Linkname. A crafted archive can therefore plant a host-absolute symlink and use a following regular-file entry to write outside the extraction directory. The flaw is reachable through remote add-on retrieval and database or file imports, and overwriting shell startup files, Git hooks, or cron entries can lead to code execution in the DDEV user&amp;#39;s context. Unzip is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.25.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;DDEV is an open-source tool for running local web development environments for PHP and Node.js. From 1.25.2 until 1.25.4, Untar in pkg/archive/archive.go validates an absolute tar symlink target after rebasing it beneath dest, but creates the symlink with the raw absolute Linkname. A crafted archive can therefore plant a host-absolute symlink and use a following regular-file entry to write outside the extraction directory. The flaw is reachable through remote add-on retrieval and database or file imports, and overwriting shell startup files, Git hooks, or cron entries can lead to code execution in the DDEV user&amp;#39;s context. Unzip is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.25.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108262</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9hq4-hm3j-jmph — DDEV incomplete tar symlink traversal fix allows host file overwrite - Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32885</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9hq4-hm3j-jmph</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ddev/ddev&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CVE-2026-32885 ZipSlip fix added a symlink-target escape check to Untar, but the check rebases an ABSOLUTE symlink target into dest before validating (filepath.Join(dest, &amp;#34;/etc&amp;#34;) stays lexically inside dest and passes), while the symlink is then created with the RAW absolute target via os.Symlink(file.Linkname, ...), so a malicious archive plants a host-absolute symlink and a following regular-file entry writes through it, restoring arbitrary host file create/overwrite (reaching $HOME rc-files, hence RCE). Confirmed at HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## The defect (the symlink check is a no-op for absolute targets)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-32885 (fixed v1.25.2, commit 05cbe299) added a lexical containment check on the entry path and a NEW symlink-target validation. pkg/archive/archive.go, Untar, tar.TypeSymlink case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
if filepath.IsAbs(file.Linkname) {
    resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(dest, file.Linkname)   // line 298: absolute target REBASED into dest
} else {
    resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(fullPathDir, file.Linkname)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(resolvedTarget)+sep, filepath.Clean(dest)+sep) {  // line 302
    return ...escapes destination...                       // line 303
}
_ = os.Remove(fullPath)                                     // line 307
err = os.Symlink(file.Linkname, fullPath)                  // line 310: writes the RAW Linkname
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For an absolute Linkname like /Users/victim, line 298 computes filepath.Join(dest, &amp;#34;/Users/victim&amp;#34;) = dest/Users/victim (lexical…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ddev/ddev&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CVE-2026-32885 ZipSlip fix added a symlink-target escape check to Untar, but the check rebases an ABSOLUTE symlink target into dest before validating (filepath.Join(dest, &amp;#34;/etc&amp;#34;) stays lexically inside dest and passes), while the symlink is then created with the RAW absolute target via os.Symlink(file.Linkname, ...), so a malicious archive plants a host-absolute symlink and a following regular-file entry writes through it, restoring arbitrary host file create/overwrite (reaching $HOME rc-files, hence RCE). Confirmed at HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## The defect (the symlink check is a no-op for absolute targets)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-32885 (fixed v1.25.2, commit 05cbe299) added a lexical containment check on the entry path and a NEW symlink-target validation. pkg/archive/archive.go, Untar, tar.TypeSymlink case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
if filepath.IsAbs(file.Linkname) {
    resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(dest, file.Linkname)   // line 298: absolute target REBASED into dest
} else {
    resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(fullPathDir, file.Linkname)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(resolvedTarget)+sep, filepath.Clean(dest)+sep) {  // line 302
    return ...escapes destination...                       // line 303
}
_ = os.Remove(fullPath)                                     // line 307
err = os.Symlink(file.Linkname, fullPath)                  // line 310: writes the RAW Linkname
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For an absolute Linkname like /Users/victim, line 298 computes filepath.Join(dest, &amp;#34;/Users/victim&amp;#34;) = dest/Users/victim (lexical…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9hq4-hm3j-jmph</guid>
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