https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 18 Oct 2026 21:52:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349165 EUVD-2026-349165 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349165 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10652 <p>Zephyr&#39;s DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buffer via memcpy without their own bounds check, and pass the result to the application&#39;s resolve callback. A malicious or spoofed DNS server, an on-path attacker forging UDP DNS replies, or (with mDNS/LLMNR enabled) any LAN node can craft a truncated TXT or SRV response that causes an out-of-bounds read of adjacent receive-pool memory; the disclosed stale bytes (residual contents of prior DNS packets / uninitialized pool memory) are returned to the application as TXT/SRV record contents, an information leak, and may in some configurations cross the allocation boundary and fault, causing a denial of service. The read is bounded (~64 bytes for TXT, ~6 for SRV) and read-only (no write). The fix rejects any record whose declared rdata extends past dns_msg-&gt;msg_size at the single chokepoint in dns_unpack_answer(). Affected: v4.3.0 and v4.4.0.</p> <p>Zephyr&#39;s DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buffer via memcpy without their own bounds check, and pass the result to the application&#39;s resolve callback. A malicious or spoofed DNS server, an on-path attacker forging UDP DNS replies, or (with mDNS/LLMNR enabled) any LAN node can craft a truncated TXT or SRV response that causes an out-of-bounds read of adjacent receive-pool memory; the disclosed stale bytes (residual contents of prior DNS packets / uninitialized pool memory) are returned to the application as TXT/SRV record contents, an information leak, and may in some configurations cross the allocation boundary and fault, causing a denial of service. The read is bounded (~64 bytes for TXT, ~6 for SRV) and read-only (no write). The fix rejects any record whose declared rdata extends past dns_msg-&gt;msg_size at the single chokepoint in dns_unpack_answer(). Affected: v4.3.0 and v4.4.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10652