https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 19:09:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263480 EUVD-2026-263480 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263480 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67737 <p>AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Versions 0.23.1 mistakenly include an API endpoint that is intended for internal use by the SFTP software sftpgo, exposing it to the public-facing HTTP API for AzuraCast installations. A user with specific internal knowledge of a station&#39;s operations can craft a custom HTTP request that would affect the contents of a station&#39;s database, without revealing any internal information about the station. In order to carry out an attack, a malicious user would need to know a valid SFTP station username and the coordinating internal filesystem structure. This issue is fixed in version 0.23.2.</p> <p>AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Versions 0.23.1 mistakenly include an API endpoint that is intended for internal use by the SFTP software sftpgo, exposing it to the public-facing HTTP API for AzuraCast installations. A user with specific internal knowledge of a station&#39;s operations can craft a custom HTTP request that would affect the contents of a station&#39;s database, without revealing any internal information about the station. In order to carry out an attack, a malicious user would need to know a valid SFTP station username and the coordinating internal filesystem structure. This issue is fixed in version 0.23.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67737 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9449-rphm-mjqr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: azuracast/azuracast</p> <p>An API endpoint that is intended for internal use by the SFTP software `sftpgo` was mistakenly exposed to the public-facing HTTP API for AzuraCast installations.</p> <p>This would allow a user with specific internal knowledge of a station&#39;s operations to craft a custom HTTP request that would affect the contents of a station&#39;s database, without revealing any internal information about the station.</p> <p>With a request like:</p> <p>``` curl -s -X POST &#34;http://localhost/api/internal/sftp-event&#34; -H &#34;Content-Type: application/json&#34; -d &#39;{ &#34;action&#34;: &#34;pre-delete&#34;, &#34;username&#34;: &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;path&#34;: &#34;/var/azuracast/stations/test/media/test.mp3&#34; }&#39; ```</p> <p>A remote user could simulate a request from `sftpgo` informing the software that a file was about to be deleted from the path given. In anticipation of this, AzuraCast would delete the corresponding database record for that file. While AzuraCast would then later discover on its own that the file actually exists and recreate the media record, it would not have the same playlist associations or custom metadata as the previous instance of the media record in the database.</p> <p>Some mitigating factors affecting the severity of this issue include: - A user would need to know a valid SFTP username corresponding to the specific station in question. - A user would need to know the internal filesystem structure of a station (or be able to brute-force or guess paths). - Any call to this internal API endpoint does not return any information to the calli…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: azuracast/azuracast</p> <p>An API endpoint that is intended for internal use by the SFTP software `sftpgo` was mistakenly exposed to the public-facing HTTP API for AzuraCast installations.</p> <p>This would allow a user with specific internal knowledge of a station&#39;s operations to craft a custom HTTP request that would affect the contents of a station&#39;s database, without revealing any internal information about the station.</p> <p>With a request like:</p> <p>``` curl -s -X POST &#34;http://localhost/api/internal/sftp-event&#34; -H &#34;Content-Type: application/json&#34; -d &#39;{ &#34;action&#34;: &#34;pre-delete&#34;, &#34;username&#34;: &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;path&#34;: &#34;/var/azuracast/stations/test/media/test.mp3&#34; }&#39; ```</p> <p>A remote user could simulate a request from `sftpgo` informing the software that a file was about to be deleted from the path given. In anticipation of this, AzuraCast would delete the corresponding database record for that file. While AzuraCast would then later discover on its own that the file actually exists and recreate the media record, it would not have the same playlist associations or custom metadata as the previous instance of the media record in the database.</p> <p>Some mitigating factors affecting the severity of this issue include: - A user would need to know a valid SFTP username corresponding to the specific station in question. - A user would need to know the internal filesystem structure of a station (or be able to brute-force or guess paths). - Any call to this internal API endpoint does not return any information to the calli…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9449-rphm-mjqr