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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-263214</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263214</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-263214</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263214</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-67510</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67510</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Neuron is a PHP framework for creating and orchestrating AI Agents. In versions 2.8.11 and below, the MySQLWriteTool executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using PDO::prepare() + execute() without semantic restrictions. This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DELETE, ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions). Deployments that expose an agent with MySQLWriteTool enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges are impacted. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Neuron is a PHP framework for creating and orchestrating AI Agents. In versions 2.8.11 and below, the MySQLWriteTool executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using PDO::prepare() + execute() without semantic restrictions. This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DELETE, ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions). Deployments that expose an agent with MySQLWriteTool enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges are impacted. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-898v-775g-777c — Neuron MySQLWriteTool allows arbitrary/destructive SQL when exposed to untrusted prompts (agent “footgun”)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-898v-775g-777c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: neuron-core/neuron-ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`MySQLWriteTool` executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using `PDO::prepare()` + `execute()` without semantic restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DELETE`, `ALTER`, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is impacted:** Deployments that expose an agent with `MySQLWriteTool` enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Not patched in:** 2.8.11&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g., `insertRecord`, `updateRecord`) with allowlisted tables/columns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only `INSERT`/`UPDATE` on selected tables; forbid `DROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Do not enable `MySQLWriteTool` for public/untrusted agents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Use a dedicated DB user with **least privilege**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- no `DROP`, no `ALTER`, no `GRANT`, no access to sensitive tables unless necessary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add an application-layer policy rejecting high…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: neuron-core/neuron-ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`MySQLWriteTool` executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using `PDO::prepare()` + `execute()` without semantic restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DELETE`, `ALTER`, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is impacted:** Deployments that expose an agent with `MySQLWriteTool` enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Not patched in:** 2.8.11&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g., `insertRecord`, `updateRecord`) with allowlisted tables/columns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only `INSERT`/`UPDATE` on selected tables; forbid `DROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Do not enable `MySQLWriteTool` for public/untrusted agents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Use a dedicated DB user with **least privilege**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- no `DROP`, no `ALTER`, no `GRANT`, no access to sensitive tables unless necessary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add an application-layer policy rejecting high…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-898v-775g-777c</guid>
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