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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-255300</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-255300</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-255300</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-255300</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2025-62427</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-62427</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular&amp;#39;s Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr) before 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8. The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page&amp;#39;s virtual location (accessible via DOCUMENT or PlatformLocation tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent relative HTTP requests made during the SSR process (e.g., using HttpClient.get(&amp;#39;assets/data.json&amp;#39;)) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker&amp;#39;s domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular&amp;#39;s Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr) before 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8. The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page&amp;#39;s virtual location (accessible via DOCUMENT or PlatformLocation tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent relative HTTP requests made during the SSR process (e.g., using HttpClient.get(&amp;#39;assets/data.json&amp;#39;)) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker&amp;#39;s domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-62427</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr — Angular SSR has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q63q-pgmf-mxhr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @angular/ssr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular&amp;#39;s Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page&amp;#39;s virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get(&amp;#39;assets/data.json&amp;#39;)`) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker&amp;#39;s domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Exploit Scenario
A request to `http://localhost:4200//attacker-domain.com/some-page` causes Angular to believe the host is attacker-domain.com. A relative request to api/data then becomes a server-side request to `http://attacker-domain.com/api/data`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `@angular/ssr` 19.2.18
- `@angular/ssr` 20.3.6
- `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-nex…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @angular/ssr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular&amp;#39;s Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page&amp;#39;s virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get(&amp;#39;assets/data.json&amp;#39;)`) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker&amp;#39;s domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Exploit Scenario
A request to `http://localhost:4200//attacker-domain.com/some-page` causes Angular to believe the host is attacker-domain.com. A relative request to api/data then becomes a server-side request to `http://attacker-domain.com/api/data`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `@angular/ssr` 19.2.18
- `@angular/ssr` 20.3.6
- `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-nex…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q63q-pgmf-mxhr</guid>
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