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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-250489</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-250489</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-250489</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-250489</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-57801</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-57801</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-57801</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj — gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-95v9-hv42-pwrj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/consensys/gnark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploitation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
package main&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;import (
	&amp;#34;crypto/rand&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;fmt&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;math/big&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc&amp;#34;
	mimcHash &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc&amp;#34;
	eddsaCrypto &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards&amp;#34;
	stdMimc &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc&amp;#34;
	stdEddsa &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;te &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards&amp;#34;
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
	Msg frontend.Variable  `gnark:&amp;#34;,public&amp;#34;`
	Pk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:&amp;#34;,public&amp;#34;`
	Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func (c *…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/consensys/gnark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S &amp;lt; order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploitation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
package main&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;import (
	&amp;#34;crypto/rand&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;fmt&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;math/big&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc&amp;#34;
	mimcHash &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc&amp;#34;
	eddsaCrypto &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs&amp;#34;
	&amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards&amp;#34;
	stdMimc &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc&amp;#34;
	stdEddsa &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;te &amp;#34;github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards&amp;#34;
)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
	Msg frontend.Variable  `gnark:&amp;#34;,public&amp;#34;`
	Pk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:&amp;#34;,public&amp;#34;`
	Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func (c *…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-95v9-hv42-pwrj</guid>
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