https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 16:15:16 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267412 EUVD-2026-267412 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267412 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-54888 <p>Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub. In versions below 1.3.20, 1.4.0-dev.585 through 1.4.12, 1.5.0-dev.636 through 1.5.4, 1.6.0-dev.754 through 1.6.7, 1.7.0-pr.251.885 through 1.7.8 and 1.8.0-dev.909 through 1.8.4, an authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances. This is fixed in versions 1.3.20, 1.4.13, 1.5.5, 1.6.8, 1.7.9 and 1.8.5.</p> <p>Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub. In versions below 1.3.20, 1.4.0-dev.585 through 1.4.12, 1.5.0-dev.636 through 1.5.4, 1.6.0-dev.754 through 1.6.7, 1.7.0-pr.251.885 through 1.7.8 and 1.8.0-dev.909 through 1.8.4, an authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances. This is fixed in versions 1.3.20, 1.4.13, 1.5.5, 1.6.8, 1.7.9 and 1.8.5.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-54888 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6jcc-xgcr-q3h4 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @fedify/fedify</p> <p>### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances</p> <p>### Details The vulnerability exists in handleInboxInternal function in fedify/federation/handler.ts. The critical flaw is in the order of operations:</p> <p>1. Line 1712: routeActivity() is called first, which processes the activity (either immediately or by adding to queue) 2. Line 1730: Authentication check (doesActorOwnKey) happens AFTER processing</p> <p>```ts // fedify/federation/handler.ts:1712-1750 const routeResult = await routeActivity({ // ← Activity processed here context: ctx, json, activity, recipient, inboxListeners, inboxContextFactory, inboxErrorHandler, kv, kvPrefixes, queue, span, tracerProvider, });</p> <p>if ( httpSigKey != null &amp;&amp; !await doesActorOwnKey(activity, httpSigKey, ctx) // ← Auth check too late ) { // Returns 401, but activity already processed return new Response(&#34;The signer and the actor do not match.&#34;, { status: 401, headers: { &#34;Content-Type&#34;: &#34;text/plain; charset=utf-8&#34; }, }); } ```</p> <p>By the time the 401 response is returned, the malicious activity has already been processed or queued.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>1. Create an activity claiming to be f…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @fedify/fedify</p> <p>### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances</p> <p>### Details The vulnerability exists in handleInboxInternal function in fedify/federation/handler.ts. The critical flaw is in the order of operations:</p> <p>1. Line 1712: routeActivity() is called first, which processes the activity (either immediately or by adding to queue) 2. Line 1730: Authentication check (doesActorOwnKey) happens AFTER processing</p> <p>```ts // fedify/federation/handler.ts:1712-1750 const routeResult = await routeActivity({ // ← Activity processed here context: ctx, json, activity, recipient, inboxListeners, inboxContextFactory, inboxErrorHandler, kv, kvPrefixes, queue, span, tracerProvider, });</p> <p>if ( httpSigKey != null &amp;&amp; !await doesActorOwnKey(activity, httpSigKey, ctx) // ← Auth check too late ) { // Returns 401, but activity already processed return new Response(&#34;The signer and the actor do not match.&#34;, { status: 401, headers: { &#34;Content-Type&#34;: &#34;text/plain; charset=utf-8&#34; }, }); } ```</p> <p>By the time the 401 response is returned, the malicious activity has already been processed or queued.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>1. Create an activity claiming to be f…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6jcc-xgcr-q3h4