EUVD-2026-248758

fkie_cve-2025-54585

GitProxy is an application that stands between developers and a Git remote endpoint. In versions 1.19.1 and below, attackers can exploit the way GitProxy handles new branch creation to bypass the approval of prior commits on the parent branch. The vulnerability impacts all users or organizations relying on GitProxy to enforce policy and prevent unapproved changes. It requires no elevated privileges beyond regular push access, and no extra user interaction. It does however, require a GitProxy administrator or designated user (canUserApproveRejectPush) to approve pushes to the child branch. This is fixed in version 1.19.2.

GHSA-39p2-8hq9-fwj6 — GitProxy New Branch Approval Exploit

Affected: npm: @finos/git-proxy

### Summary An attacker can exploit the way GitProxy handles new branch creation to bypass the approval of prior commits on the parent branch.

Because it can greatly affect system integrity, we classify this as a High impact vulnerability.

### Details GitProxy checks for the `0000000000000000000000000000000000000000` hash to detect new branches. This is used to process the commit accordingly in both `getDiff.ts` and `parsePush.ts`. However, the logic can be exploited as follows:

1. Make a commit in branch `a` (could be `main`) 2. Make a new branch `b` from that commit 3. Make a new commit in `b`, then approve it/get it approved 4. Go back to `a`, and attempt to push this commit to the proxy

The unapproved commit from `a` will be pushed to the remote.

### PoC To reproduce this vulnerability:

1. Clone the target repository and make an unapproved commit on a mainline branch (e.g. main):

```bash git checkout -b a origin/main echo "DEBUG=true" > config.env git add config.env git commit -m "Sensitive debug config" git push proxy a ```

2. Without approving/getting the commit approved on branch `a`, create a new branch `b` based on it:

```bash git checkout -b b echo "feature x implemented" > feature.txt git add feature.txt git commit -m "Feature implementation" git push proxy b ```

3. Approve/get approval for the push to branch `b`.

4. Now attempt to push the original unapproved commit from branch `a`:

```bash git checkout a git push proxy a ```

Prior to `1.19.2`, this…

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EUVD-2026-248758

fkie_cve-2025-54585

GHSA-39p2-8hq9-fwj6 — GitProxy New Branch Approval Exploit