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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-341674</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341674</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-341674</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341674</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-34500</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-34500</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deck Mate 2&amp;#39;s firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit&amp;#39;s USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device&amp;#39;s integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deck Mate 2&amp;#39;s firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit&amp;#39;s USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device&amp;#39;s integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-34500</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rhx6-vj26-2frq</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rhx6-vj26-2frq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deck Mate 2&amp;#39;s firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit&amp;#39;s USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device&amp;#39;s integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deck Mate 2&amp;#39;s firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit&amp;#39;s USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device&amp;#39;s integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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