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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 09:31:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-291909</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291909</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-291909</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291909</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-1686</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-1686</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Versions of the package io.pebbletemplates:pebble from 0 and before 4.1.0 are vulnerable to External Control of File Name or Path via the include tag. A high privileged attacker can access sensitive local files by crafting malicious notification templates that leverage this tag to include files like /etc/passwd or /proc/1/environ.&#13;&#13; Workaround&#13;&#13;This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling the include macro in Pebble Templates:&#13;&#13;java&#13;new PebbleEngine.Builder()&#13;            .registerExtensionCustomizer(new DisallowExtensionCustomizerBuilder()&#13;                    .disallowedTokenParserTags(List.of(&amp;#34;include&amp;#34;))&#13;                    .build())&#13;            .build();&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Versions of the package io.pebbletemplates:pebble from 0 and before 4.1.0 are vulnerable to External Control of File Name or Path via the include tag. A high privileged attacker can access sensitive local files by crafting malicious notification templates that leverage this tag to include files like /etc/passwd or /proc/1/environ.&#13;&#13; Workaround&#13;&#13;This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling the include macro in Pebble Templates:&#13;&#13;java&#13;new PebbleEngine.Builder()&#13;            .registerExtensionCustomizer(new DisallowExtensionCustomizerBuilder()&#13;                    .disallowedTokenParserTags(List.of(&amp;#34;include&amp;#34;))&#13;                    .build())&#13;            .build();&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-1686</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p75g-cxfj-7wrx — Pebble has Arbitrary Local File Inclusion (LFI) Vulnerability via `include` macro</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p75g-cxfj-7wrx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.pebbletemplates:pebble&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If untrusted user input is used to dynamically create a `PebbleTemplate` with the method `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate`, then an attacker can include arbitrary local files from the file system into the generated template, leaking potentially sensitive information into the output of `PebbleTemplate#evaluate`. This is done via the `include` macro.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `include` macro calls `PebbleTempateImpl#resolveRelativePath` with the `relativePath` argument passed within the template:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example template:
```
{% include [relativePath] %}
```
When `resolveRelativePath` is called, the `relativePath`  is resolved against the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
  /**
   * This method resolves the given relative path based on this template file path.
   *
   * @param relativePath the path which should be resolved.
   * @return the resolved path.
   */
  public String resolveRelativePath(String relativePath) {
    String resolved = this.engine.getLoader().resolveRelativePath(relativePath, this.name);
    if (resolved == null) {
      return relativePath;
    } else {
      return resolved;
    }
  }
```
https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/blob/82ad7fcf9e9eaa45ee82ae3335a1409d19c10263/pebble/src/main/java/io/pebbletemplates/pebble/template/PebbleTemplateImpl.java#L380&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, when the template is created from a string, as is the case when `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate` is used, the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable is actually the entirety of…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: io.pebbletemplates:pebble&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If untrusted user input is used to dynamically create a `PebbleTemplate` with the method `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate`, then an attacker can include arbitrary local files from the file system into the generated template, leaking potentially sensitive information into the output of `PebbleTemplate#evaluate`. This is done via the `include` macro.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `include` macro calls `PebbleTempateImpl#resolveRelativePath` with the `relativePath` argument passed within the template:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example template:
```
{% include [relativePath] %}
```
When `resolveRelativePath` is called, the `relativePath`  is resolved against the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
  /**
   * This method resolves the given relative path based on this template file path.
   *
   * @param relativePath the path which should be resolved.
   * @return the resolved path.
   */
  public String resolveRelativePath(String relativePath) {
    String resolved = this.engine.getLoader().resolveRelativePath(relativePath, this.name);
    if (resolved == null) {
      return relativePath;
    } else {
      return resolved;
    }
  }
```
https://github.com/PebbleTemplates/pebble/blob/82ad7fcf9e9eaa45ee82ae3335a1409d19c10263/pebble/src/main/java/io/pebbletemplates/pebble/template/PebbleTemplateImpl.java#L380&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, when the template is created from a string, as is the case when `PebbleEngine#getLiteralTemplate` is used, the `PebbleTemplateImpl.name` variable is actually the entirety of…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p75g-cxfj-7wrx</guid>
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