https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 20:45:18 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-246222 EUVD-2026-246222 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-246222 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-49364 <p>tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. Prior to version 1.1.7, a private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is the buffer package. This affects only environments where require(&#39;buffer&#39;) is the NPM buffer package. The Buffer.isBuffer check can be bypassed, resulting in k reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one). This issue has been patched in version 1.1.7.</p> <p>tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. Prior to version 1.1.7, a private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is the buffer package. This affects only environments where require(&#39;buffer&#39;) is the NPM buffer package. The Buffer.isBuffer check can be bypassed, resulting in k reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one). This issue has been patched in version 1.1.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-49364 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mc2-6phr-23xc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: tiny-secp256k1</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer)</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>This affects only environments where `require(&#39;buffer&#39;)` is &lt;https://npmjs.com/buffer&gt; E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc.</p> <p>`Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in `k` reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one)</p> <p>v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance</p> <p>Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction</p> <p>While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still should not leak the private key</p> <p>Also, message validation could have the same bug (out of scope for this report, but could be possible in some situations), which makes this attack more likely when used in a chain</p> <p>https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/pull/140 is a subtle fix for this</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>This code deliberately doesn&#39;t provide `funnyBuffer` and `extractTiny` for now, could be updated later</p> <p>```js import secp256k1 from &#39;tiny-secp256k1&#39; import crypto from &#39;crypto&#39;</p> <p>const key = crypto.rand…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: tiny-secp256k1</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer)</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>This affects only environments where `require(&#39;buffer&#39;)` is &lt;https://npmjs.com/buffer&gt; E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc.</p> <p>`Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in `k` reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one)</p> <p>v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance</p> <p>Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction</p> <p>While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still should not leak the private key</p> <p>Also, message validation could have the same bug (out of scope for this report, but could be possible in some situations), which makes this attack more likely when used in a chain</p> <p>https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/pull/140 is a subtle fix for this</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>This code deliberately doesn&#39;t provide `funnyBuffer` and `extractTiny` for now, could be updated later</p> <p>```js import secp256k1 from &#39;tiny-secp256k1&#39; import crypto from &#39;crypto&#39;</p> <p>const key = crypto.rand…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mc2-6phr-23xc