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EUVD-2026-193936

fkie_cve-2024-45291

PHPSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with `$writer->setEmbedImages(true);` those files will be included in the output as `data:` URLs, regardless of the file's type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability. When embedding images has been enabled, an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server and perform arbitrary HTTP GET requests. Note that any PHP protocol wrappers can be used, meaning that if for example the `expect://` wrapper is enabled, also remote code execution is possible. This issue has been addressed in release versions 1.29.2, 2.1.1, and 2.3.0. All users are advised to upgrade. there are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4 — PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery in HTML writer when embedding images is e…

Affected: Packagist: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, Packagist: phpoffice/phpexcel

### Summary

It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with `$writer->setEmbedImages(true);` those files will be included in the output as `data:` URLs, regardless of the file's type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability.

### Details

XLSX files allow embedding or linking media. When

In `xl/drawings/drawing1.xml` an attacker can do e.g.: ```xml <a:blip cstate="print" r:link="rId1" /> ```

And then, in `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` they can set the path to anything, such as: ```xml <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image" Target="/etc/passwd" /> ``` or ```xml <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image" Target="http://example.org" /> ```

When the HTML writer is outputting the image, it does not check the path in any way. Also the `getimagesize()` call does not mitigate this, because when `getimagesize()` returns false, an empty mime type is used.

```php if ($this->embedImages || str_starts_with($imageData, 'zip://')) { $picture = @file_get_contents($filename); if ($picture !== false) { $imageDetails = getimagesize($filename) ?: ['mime' => '']; // base64 encode the binary data $base64 = base64_encode($picture); $imageData = '…