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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-159354</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-159354</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-159354</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-159354</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2024-43410</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-43410</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Allocating an untrusted amount of memory allows any unauthenticated user to OOM a russh server. An SSH packet consists of a 4-byte big-endian length, followed by a byte stream of this length.
After parsing and potentially decrypting the 4-byte length, russh allocates enough memory for this bytestream, as a performance optimization to avoid reallocations later. But this length is entirely untrusted and can be set to any value by the client, causing this much memory to be allocated, which will cause the process to OOM within a few such requests. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.44.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Allocating an untrusted amount of memory allows any unauthenticated user to OOM a russh server. An SSH packet consists of a 4-byte big-endian length, followed by a byte stream of this length.
After parsing and potentially decrypting the 4-byte length, russh allocates enough memory for this bytestream, as a performance optimization to avoid reallocations later. But this length is entirely untrusted and can be set to any value by the client, causing this much memory to be allocated, which will cause the process to OOM within a few such requests. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.44.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-43410</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vgvv-x7xg-6cqg — Russh has an OOM Denial of Service due to allocation of untrusted amount</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vgvv-x7xg-6cqg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocating an untrusted amount of memory allows any unauthenticated user to OOM a russh server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An SSH packet consists of a 4-byte big-endian length, followed by a byte stream of this length.
After parsing and potentially decrypting the 4-byte length, russh allocates enough memory for this bytestream, as a performance optimization to avoid reallocations later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/4eaa080e7532662023f75e8fff45b743fe607f8c/russh/src/cipher/mod.rs#L254&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But this length is entirely untrusted and can be set to any value by the client, causing this much memory to be allocated, which will cause the process to OOM within a few such requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RFC 4253 contains an explicit section on packet length limits: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4253#section-6.1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; However, implementations SHOULD check that the packet length is reasonable in order for the implementation to avoid denial of service and/or buffer overflow attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Running the `echoserver` example on port 2222 (`cd russh &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cargo run --release --example echoserver`), the provided Rust program can be executed against this echoserver and will cause it to OOM within a few tries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;details&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;summary&amp;gt;Rust code to run against the echo server&amp;lt;/summary&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Cargo.toml`
```toml
[package]
name = &amp;#34;poc&amp;#34;
version = &amp;#34;0.1.0&amp;#34;
edition = &amp;#34;2021&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[dependencies]
hex-literal = &amp;#34;=0.4.1&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`main.rs`
```rust
use std::time::Duration;
use std::{error::Error, net::SocketAddr};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;use std::{
    i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocating an untrusted amount of memory allows any unauthenticated user to OOM a russh server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An SSH packet consists of a 4-byte big-endian length, followed by a byte stream of this length.
After parsing and potentially decrypting the 4-byte length, russh allocates enough memory for this bytestream, as a performance optimization to avoid reallocations later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/4eaa080e7532662023f75e8fff45b743fe607f8c/russh/src/cipher/mod.rs#L254&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But this length is entirely untrusted and can be set to any value by the client, causing this much memory to be allocated, which will cause the process to OOM within a few such requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RFC 4253 contains an explicit section on packet length limits: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4253#section-6.1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; However, implementations SHOULD check that the packet length is reasonable in order for the implementation to avoid denial of service and/or buffer overflow attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Running the `echoserver` example on port 2222 (`cd russh &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cargo run --release --example echoserver`), the provided Rust program can be executed against this echoserver and will cause it to OOM within a few tries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;details&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;summary&amp;gt;Rust code to run against the echo server&amp;lt;/summary&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Cargo.toml`
```toml
[package]
name = &amp;#34;poc&amp;#34;
version = &amp;#34;0.1.0&amp;#34;
edition = &amp;#34;2021&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[dependencies]
hex-literal = &amp;#34;=0.4.1&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`main.rs`
```rust
use std::time::Duration;
use std::{error::Error, net::SocketAddr};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;use std::{
    i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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