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EUVD-2026-6250

fkie_cve-2024-39687

Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub and other standards. At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network. This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well. Specifically this is a Server Side Request Forgery attack. Users should upgrade to Fedify version 0.9.2, 0.10.1, or 0.11.1 to receive a patch for this issue.

GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx — Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack in Fedify

Affected: npm: @fedify/fedify

### Summary At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network.

This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well.

Specifically this is a [Server Side Request Forgery attack](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery). You can learn more about SSRF attacks via [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)

### Details

When Fedify makes a request at runtime via the DocLoader [1] [2], the `fetch` API does not first check the URI's to assert that it resolve to a public IP address. Additionally, any downstream software of Fedify that may fetch data from URIs contained within Activities or Objects maybe be at risk of requesting non-public resources, and storing those, exposing non-public information to the public.

Additionally, in many cases the URIs are not asserted to be either strictly HTTPS or HTTP protocols, which could lead to further attacks, and there is no check that the URI contains a `hostname` part. Whilst the [`fetch()` specification](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/) may provide some safety here, along with underlying fetch implementation…