<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 19:35:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-4961</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-4961</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-4961</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-4961</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2024-31457</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-31457</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -&amp;gt; Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -&amp;gt; Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-31457</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gv3w-m57p-3wc4 — gin-vue-admin background arbitrary code coverage vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gv3w-m57p-3wc4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
&amp;#34;gin-vue-admin&amp;lt;=v2.6.1 has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -&amp;gt; Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the &amp;#39;plugName&amp;#39; parameter. They can create specific folders such as &amp;#39;api&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;config&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;global&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;router&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;service&amp;#39;, and &amp;#39;main.go&amp;#39; function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected code: https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/blob/746af378990ebf3367f8bb3d4e9684936df152e7/server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go:239. Let&amp;#39;s take a look at the method &amp;#39;AutoPlug&amp;#39; within the &amp;#39;AutoCodeApi&amp;#39; struct.
```go
func (autoApi *AutoCodeApi) AutoPlug(c *gin.Context) {
	var a system.AutoPlugReq
	err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&amp;amp;a)
	if err != nil {
		response.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c)
		return
	}
	a.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName)
	a.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse
	err = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a)
	if err != nil {
		global.GVA_LOG.Error(&amp;#34;预览失败!&amp;#34;, zap.Error(err))
		response.FailWithMessage(&amp;#34;预览失败&amp;#34;, c)
		return
	}
	response.Ok(c)
}
```
The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct.
```go
type AutoPlugReq struct {
	PlugName    string         `json:&amp;#34;plugName&amp;#34;` // 必然大写开头
	Snake       string         `json:&amp;#34;snake&amp;#34;`    // 后端自动转为 snake
	RouterGroup string         `json:&amp;#34;routerGroup&amp;#34;`
	HasGloba…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
&amp;#34;gin-vue-admin&amp;lt;=v2.6.1 has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -&amp;gt; Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the &amp;#39;plugName&amp;#39; parameter. They can create specific folders such as &amp;#39;api&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;config&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;global&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;model&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;router&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;service&amp;#39;, and &amp;#39;main.go&amp;#39; function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected code: https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/blob/746af378990ebf3367f8bb3d4e9684936df152e7/server/api/v1/system/sys_auto_code.go:239. Let&amp;#39;s take a look at the method &amp;#39;AutoPlug&amp;#39; within the &amp;#39;AutoCodeApi&amp;#39; struct.
```go
func (autoApi *AutoCodeApi) AutoPlug(c *gin.Context) {
	var a system.AutoPlugReq
	err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&amp;amp;a)
	if err != nil {
		response.FailWithMessage(err.Error(), c)
		return
	}
	a.Snake = strings.ToLower(a.PlugName)
	a.NeedModel = a.HasRequest || a.HasResponse
	err = autoCodeService.CreatePlug(a)
	if err != nil {
		global.GVA_LOG.Error(&amp;#34;预览失败!&amp;#34;, zap.Error(err))
		response.FailWithMessage(&amp;#34;预览失败&amp;#34;, c)
		return
	}
	response.Ok(c)
}
```
The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct.
```go
type AutoPlugReq struct {
	PlugName    string         `json:&amp;#34;plugName&amp;#34;` // 必然大写开头
	Snake       string         `json:&amp;#34;snake&amp;#34;`    // 后端自动转为 snake
	RouterGroup string         `json:&amp;#34;routerGroup&amp;#34;`
	HasGloba…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gv3w-m57p-3wc4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2024-31457</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-31457</link>
      <description>gsd-2024-31457</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-31457</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
