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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-161112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161112</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-161112</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2023-47128</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47128</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Piccolo is an object-relational mapping and query builder which supports asyncio. Prior to version 1.1.1, the handling of named transaction `savepoints` in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection via f-strings. While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a `savepoints` `name` parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user. A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is: Read all data stored in the database, including usernames and password hashes; insert arbitrary data into the database, including modifying existing records; and gain a shell on the underlying server. Version 1.1.1 fixes this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Piccolo is an object-relational mapping and query builder which supports asyncio. Prior to version 1.1.1, the handling of named transaction `savepoints` in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection via f-strings. While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a `savepoints` `name` parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user. A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is: Read all data stored in the database, including usernames and password hashes; insert arbitrary data into the database, including modifying existing records; and gain a shell on the underlying server. Version 1.1.1 fixes this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47128</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xq59-7jf3-rjc6 — piccolo SQL Injection via named transaction savepoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xq59-7jf3-rjc6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The handling of named transaction savepoints in all database implementations is vulnerable to [SQL Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection) as user provided input is passed directly to `connection.execute(...)` via f-strings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An excerpt of the Postgres savepoint handling:
```python
    async def savepoint(self, name: t.Optional[str] = None) -&amp;gt; Savepoint:
        name = name or f&amp;#34;savepoint_{self.get_savepoint_id()}&amp;#34;
        await self.connection.execute(f&amp;#34;SAVEPOINT {name}&amp;#34;)
        return Savepoint(name=name, transaction=self)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, we can see user input is directly passed to `connection.execute` without being properly escaped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All implementations of savepoints and savepoint methods directly pass this `name` parameter to `connection.execute` and are vulnerable to this. A non-exhaustive list can be found below:
- Postgres
- - [One](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L239)
- - [Two](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L133)
- - [Three](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L138)
- Sqlite
- - [One](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L416)
- - [Two](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L313)
- - [Three](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L318)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Care should be given to en…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The handling of named transaction savepoints in all database implementations is vulnerable to [SQL Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection) as user provided input is passed directly to `connection.execute(...)` via f-strings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An excerpt of the Postgres savepoint handling:
```python
    async def savepoint(self, name: t.Optional[str] = None) -&amp;gt; Savepoint:
        name = name or f&amp;#34;savepoint_{self.get_savepoint_id()}&amp;#34;
        await self.connection.execute(f&amp;#34;SAVEPOINT {name}&amp;#34;)
        return Savepoint(name=name, transaction=self)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In this example, we can see user input is directly passed to `connection.execute` without being properly escaped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All implementations of savepoints and savepoint methods directly pass this `name` parameter to `connection.execute` and are vulnerable to this. A non-exhaustive list can be found below:
- Postgres
- - [One](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L239)
- - [Two](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L133)
- - [Three](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/postgres.py#L138)
- Sqlite
- - [One](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L416)
- - [Two](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L313)
- - [Three](https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo/blob/master/piccolo/engine/sqlite.py#L318)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Care should be given to en…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xq59-7jf3-rjc6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2023-47128</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47128</link>
      <description>gsd-2023-47128</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47128</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2023-241</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2023-241</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Piccolo is an object-relational mapping and query builder which supports asyncio. Prior to version 1.1.1, the handling of named transaction `savepoints` in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection via f-strings. While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a `savepoints` `name` parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user. A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is: Read all data stored in the database, including usernames and password hashes; insert arbitrary data into the database, including modifying existing records; and gain a shell on the underlying server. Version 1.1.1 fixes this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: piccolo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Piccolo is an object-relational mapping and query builder which supports asyncio. Prior to version 1.1.1, the handling of named transaction `savepoints` in all database implementations is vulnerable to SQL Injection via f-strings. While the likelihood of an end developer exposing a `savepoints` `name` parameter to a user is highly unlikely, it would not be unheard of. If a malicious user was able to abuse this functionality they would have essentially direct access to the database and the ability to modify data to the level of permissions associated with the database user. A non exhaustive list of actions possible based on database permissions is: Read all data stored in the database, including usernames and password hashes; insert arbitrary data into the database, including modifying existing records; and gain a shell on the underlying server. Version 1.1.1 fixes this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2023-241</guid>
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