https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 15:49:02 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0168 certfr-2024-avi-0168 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2024-avi-0168 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-259246 EUVD-2026-259246 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-259246 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46841 <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack.</p> <p>In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.</p> <p>Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack.</p> <p>In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.</p> <p>Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-46841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mxh6-2xpg-m77w <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack.</p> <p>In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.</p> <p>Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack.</p> <p>In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.</p> <p>Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mxh6-2xpg-m77w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46841 gsd-2023-46841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-46841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:13745-1 <p>xen-4.18.0_06-2.1 on GA media</p> <p>xen-4.18.0_06-2.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:13745-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2024:0830-1 <p>Security update for xen</p> <p>Security update for xen</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2024:0830-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-46841 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen</p> <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: xen, Ubuntu:25.10: xen, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: xen</p> <p>Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called &#34;shadow stacks&#34;, holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren&#39;t writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn&#39;t right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2023-46841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-0494 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Xen ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Xen ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2024-0494