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bdu:2023-04626

EUVD-2026-191952

fkie_cve-2023-39523

ScanCode.io is a server to script and automate software composition analysis with ScanPipe pipelines. Prior to version 32.5.1, the software has a possible command injection vulnerability in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the `docker_reference` parameter.

In the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image` the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`. However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections. A malicious user who is able to create or add inputs to a project can inject commands. Although the command injections are blind and the user will not receive direct feedback without logs, it is still possible to cause damage to the server/container. The vulnerability appears for example if a malicious user adds a semicolon after the input of `docker://;`, it would allow appending malicious commands.

Version 32.5.1 contains a patch for this issue. The `docker_reference` input should be sanitized to avoid command injections and, as a workaround, one may avoid creating commands with user controlled input directly.

GHSA-2ggp-cmvm-f62f — ScanCode.io command injection in docker image fetch process

Affected: PyPI: scancodeio

## Command Injection in docker fetch process

### Summary A possible command injection in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the docker_reference parameter.

### Details In the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image`[1] the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`. ```python def fetch_docker_image(docker_reference, to=None): """ code snipped .... """ platform_args = [] platform = get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference) # User controlled `docker_reference` passed """ code snipped... """ ```

However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections.

```python def get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference): """ Return a platform mapping of a docker reference. If there are more than one, return the first one by default. """ skopeo_executable = _get_skopeo_location() """ Constructing a shell command with user controlled variable `docker_reference` """ cmd = ( f"{skopeo_executable} inspect --insecure-policy --raw --no-creds " f"{docker_reference}" )

logger.info(f"Fetching image os/arch data: {cmd}") exitcode, output = pipes.run_c…

gsd-2023-39523

PYSEC-2026-1904 — ScanCode.io command injection in docker image fetch process

Affected: PyPI: scancodeio

## Command Injection in docker fetch process

### Summary A possible command injection in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the docker_reference parameter.

logger.info(f"Fetching image os/arch data: {cmd}") exitcode, output = pipes.run_c…