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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-193073</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-193073</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-193073</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-193073</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2023-38691</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-38691</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;matrix-appservice-bridge provides an API for setting up bridges. Starting in version 4.0.0 and prior to versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1, a malicious Matrix server can use a foreign user&amp;#39;s MXID in an OpenID exchange, allowing a bad actor to impersonate users when using the provisioning API. The library does not check that the servername part of the `sub` parameter (containing the user&amp;#39;s *claimed* MXID) is the the same as the servername we are talking to. A malicious actor could spin up a server on any given domain, respond with a `sub` parameter according to the user they want to act as and use the resulting token to perform provisioning requests. Versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1 contain a patch. As a workaround, disable the provisioning API.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;matrix-appservice-bridge provides an API for setting up bridges. Starting in version 4.0.0 and prior to versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1, a malicious Matrix server can use a foreign user&amp;#39;s MXID in an OpenID exchange, allowing a bad actor to impersonate users when using the provisioning API. The library does not check that the servername part of the `sub` parameter (containing the user&amp;#39;s *claimed* MXID) is the the same as the servername we are talking to. A malicious actor could spin up a server on any given domain, respond with a `sub` parameter according to the user they want to act as and use the resulting token to perform provisioning requests. Versions 8.1.2 and 9.0.1 contain a patch. As a workaround, disable the provisioning API.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-38691</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vc7j-h8xg-fv5x — matrix-appservice-bridge doesn't verify the sub parameter of an openId token exhange, allowing unauthorized access to p…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vc7j-h8xg-fv5x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: matrix-appservice-bridge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious Matrix server can use a foreign user&amp;#39;s MXID in an OpenID exchange, allowing a bad actor to impersonate users when using the provisioning API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library does not check that the servername part of the `sub` parameter (containing the user&amp;#39;s *claimed* MXID) is the same as the servername we are talking to. A malicious actor could spin up a server on any given domain, respond with a `sub` parameter according to the user they want to act as and use the resulting token to perform provisioning requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disable the provisioning API. If the bridge does not use the provisioning API, you are not vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: matrix-appservice-bridge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious Matrix server can use a foreign user&amp;#39;s MXID in an OpenID exchange, allowing a bad actor to impersonate users when using the provisioning API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library does not check that the servername part of the `sub` parameter (containing the user&amp;#39;s *claimed* MXID) is the same as the servername we are talking to. A malicious actor could spin up a server on any given domain, respond with a `sub` parameter according to the user they want to act as and use the resulting token to perform provisioning requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disable the provisioning API. If the bridge does not use the provisioning API, you are not vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vc7j-h8xg-fv5x</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>gsd-2023-38691</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-38691</link>
      <description>gsd-2023-38691</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-38691</guid>
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