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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-234277</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234277</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-234277</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-234277</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2022-24798</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-24798</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Internet Routing Registry daemon version 4 is an IRR database server, processing IRR objects in the RPSL format. IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected. This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly recommended to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Internet Routing Registry daemon version 4 is an IRR database server, processing IRR objects in the RPSL format. IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected. This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly recommended to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2022-24798</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cqxx-66wh-8pjw — Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer in irrd</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cqxx-66wh-8pjw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: irrd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurred:
* For `mntner` objects where all password hash names (`MD5-PW` and `CRYPT-PW`) were in lower or mixed case in the `auth` attribute. For these objects, hashes remained in the output of all queries of any method and all database exports made with the `export_destination` setting. Fortunately, objects in the common public IRR database virtually all use uppercase hash names which means very few of those objects were affected.
* For any GraphQL queries that queried the `auth` field on `mntner` objects.
* For any GraphQL queries that queried the `objectText` field on the `journal` field on `mntner` objects, if the `nrtm_access_list` setting permitted journal access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two GraphQL cases are visible in logs, allowing users to determine whether any existing objects had their hashes exposed.
This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: irrd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurred:
* For `mntner` objects where all password hash names (`MD5-PW` and `CRYPT-PW`) were in lower or mixed case in the `auth` attribute. For these objects, hashes remained in the output of all queries of any method and all database exports made with the `export_destination` setting. Fortunately, objects in the common public IRR database virtually all use uppercase hash names which means very few of those objects were affected.
* For any GraphQL queries that queried the `auth` field on `mntner` objects.
* For any GraphQL queries that queried the `objectText` field on the `journal` field on `mntner` objects, if the `nrtm_access_list` setting permitted journal access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two GraphQL cases are visible in logs, allowing users to determine whether any existing objects had their hashes exposed.
This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cqxx-66wh-8pjw</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>gsd-2022-24798</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-24798</link>
      <description>gsd-2022-24798</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2022-24798</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2022-178</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2022-178</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: irrd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Internet Routing Registry daemon version 4 is an IRR database server, processing IRR objects in the RPSL format. IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected. This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly recommended to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: irrd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Internet Routing Registry daemon version 4 is an IRR database server, processing IRR objects in the RPSL format. IRRd did not always filter password hashes in query responses relating to `mntner` objects and database exports. This may have allowed adversaries to retrieve some of these hashes, perform a brute-force search for the clear-text passphrase, and use these to make unauthorised changes to affected IRR objects. This issue only affected instances that process password hashes, which means it is limited to IRRd instances that serve authoritative databases. IRRd instances operating solely as mirrors of other IRR databases are not affected. This has been fixed in IRRd 4.2.3 and the main branch. Versions in the 4.1.x series never were affected. Users of the 4.2.x series are strongly recommended to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2022-178</guid>
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