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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 16:27:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-31520</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-31520</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-31520</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-31520</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2021-41173</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-41173</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Go Ethereum is the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocol. Prior to version 1.10.9, a vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer. Version v1.10.9 contains patches to the vulnerability. There are no known workarounds aside from upgrading.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-41173</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v — Geth Node Vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted p2p message</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59hh-656j-3p7v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer, via the `snap/1` protocol. The crash can be triggered by sending a malicious `snap/1` `GetTrieNodes` package.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On September 21, 2021, geth-team member Gary Rong (@rjl493456442) found a way to crash the snap request handler . 
By using this vulnerability, a peer connected on the `snap/1` protocol could cause a vulnerable node to crash with a `panic`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the `trie.TryGetNode` implementation, if the requested path is reached, the associated node will be returned. However the nilness is
not checked there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```golang
func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
	if pos &amp;gt;= len(path) {
		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
		// that into consensus form can be nasty (needs to cascade down) and
		// time consuming. Instead, just pull the hash up from disk directly.
		var hash hashNode
		if node, ok := origNode.(hashNode); ok {
			hash = node
		} else {
			hash, _ = origNode.cache()
		}
```
More specifically the `origNode` can be nil(e.g. the child of fullnode) and system can panic at line `hash, _ = origNode.cache()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When investigating this, @holiman tried to find it via fuzzing, which uncovered a second crasher, also related to the snap `GetTrieNodes` package. If the caller requests a st…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer, via the `snap/1` protocol. The crash can be triggered by sending a malicious `snap/1` `GetTrieNodes` package.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On September 21, 2021, geth-team member Gary Rong (@rjl493456442) found a way to crash the snap request handler . 
By using this vulnerability, a peer connected on the `snap/1` protocol could cause a vulnerable node to crash with a `panic`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the `trie.TryGetNode` implementation, if the requested path is reached, the associated node will be returned. However the nilness is
not checked there.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```golang
func (t *Trie) tryGetNode(origNode node, path []byte, pos int) (item []byte, newnode node, resolved int, err error) {
	// If we reached the requested path, return the current node
	if pos &amp;gt;= len(path) {
		// Although we most probably have the original node expanded, encoding
		// that into consensus form can be nasty (needs to cascade down) and
		// time consuming. Instead, just pull the hash up from disk directly.
		var hash hashNode
		if node, ok := origNode.(hashNode); ok {
			hash = node
		} else {
			hash, _ = origNode.cache()
		}
```
More specifically the `origNode` can be nil(e.g. the child of fullnode) and system can panic at line `hash, _ = origNode.cache()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When investigating this, @holiman tried to find it via fuzzing, which uncovered a second crasher, also related to the snap `GetTrieNodes` package. If the caller requests a st…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59hh-656j-3p7v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2021-41173</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-41173</link>
      <description>gsd-2021-41173</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-41173</guid>
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