<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:33:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-46023</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-46023</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-46023</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-46023</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2020-26277</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2020-26277</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;DBdeployer is a tool that deploys MySQL database servers easily. In DBdeployer before version 1.58.2, users unpacking a tarball may use a maliciously packaged tarball that contains symlinks to files external to the target. In such scenario, an attacker could induce dbdeployer to write into a system file, thus altering the computer defenses. For the attack to succeed, the following factors need to contribute: 1) The user is logged in as root. While dbdeployer is usable as root, it was designed to run as unprivileged user. 2) The user has taken a tarball from a non secure source, without testing the checksum. When the tarball is retrieved through dbdeployer, the checksum is compared before attempting to unpack. This has been fixed in version 1.58.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;DBdeployer is a tool that deploys MySQL database servers easily. In DBdeployer before version 1.58.2, users unpacking a tarball may use a maliciously packaged tarball that contains symlinks to files external to the target. In such scenario, an attacker could induce dbdeployer to write into a system file, thus altering the computer defenses. For the attack to succeed, the following factors need to contribute: 1) The user is logged in as root. While dbdeployer is usable as root, it was designed to run as unprivileged user. 2) The user has taken a tarball from a non secure source, without testing the checksum. When the tarball is retrieved through dbdeployer, the checksum is compared before attempting to unpack. This has been fixed in version 1.58.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2020-26277</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-47wr-426j-fr82 — Symbolic links in an unpacking routine may enable attackers to read and/or write to arbitrary locations in dbdeployer</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47wr-426j-fr82</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_Users unpacking a tarball through dbdeployer may use a maliciously packaged tarball that contains symlinks to files external to the target. In such scenario, an attacker could induce dbdeployer to write into a system file, thus altering the computer defences._&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigating factors
For the attach to succeed, the following factors need to contribute:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* The user is logged in as root. While dbdeployer is usable as root, it was designed to run as unprivileged user.
*  The user has taken a tarball from a non secure source, without testing the checksum. When the tarball is retrieved through dbdeployer, the checksum is compared before attempting to unpack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could inject a symbolic link into the tarball, so that a file could result into `fake_file -&amp;gt; /etc/passwd` or some equally  important file.
As it is now, dbdeployer would create the symlink as defined, with a local file `fake_file` linked to `/etc/passwd`. The danger here is that any process with the privileges to write to both `fake_file` and `/etc/passwd` could overwrite the system file. Even without malicious intent, this could result in the system to become unusable.
As noted above, the user must have write privileges to the target file to do the damage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remedies&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It has been suggested that the extract procedure use `filepath.EvalSymlinks` to determine whether the target is within the extraction directory. Unfortunately, this approach is unavailable in this context, because it wo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/datacharmer/dbdeployer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_Users unpacking a tarball through dbdeployer may use a maliciously packaged tarball that contains symlinks to files external to the target. In such scenario, an attacker could induce dbdeployer to write into a system file, thus altering the computer defences._&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigating factors
For the attach to succeed, the following factors need to contribute:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* The user is logged in as root. While dbdeployer is usable as root, it was designed to run as unprivileged user.
*  The user has taken a tarball from a non secure source, without testing the checksum. When the tarball is retrieved through dbdeployer, the checksum is compared before attempting to unpack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could inject a symbolic link into the tarball, so that a file could result into `fake_file -&amp;gt; /etc/passwd` or some equally  important file.
As it is now, dbdeployer would create the symlink as defined, with a local file `fake_file` linked to `/etc/passwd`. The danger here is that any process with the privileges to write to both `fake_file` and `/etc/passwd` could overwrite the system file. Even without malicious intent, this could result in the system to become unusable.
As noted above, the user must have write privileges to the target file to do the damage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remedies&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It has been suggested that the extract procedure use `filepath.EvalSymlinks` to determine whether the target is within the extraction directory. Unfortunately, this approach is unavailable in this context, because it wo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47wr-426j-fr82</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gsd-2020-26277</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2020-26277</link>
      <description>gsd-2020-26277</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2020-26277</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
