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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-70041</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-70041</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-70041</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-70041</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2018-19983</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2018-19983</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered on Sigma Design Z-Wave S0 through S2 devices. An attacker first prepares a Z-Wave frame-transmission program (e.g., Z-Wave PC Controller, OpenZWave, CC1110, etc.). Next, the attacker conducts a DoS attack against the Z-Wave S0 Security version product by continuously sending divided &amp;#34;Nonce Get (0x98 0x81)&amp;#34; frames. The reason for dividing the &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame is that, in security version S0, when a node receives a &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame, the node produces a random new nonce and sends it to the Src node of the received &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame. After the nonce value is generated and transmitted, the node transitions to wait mode. At this time, when &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; is received again, the node discards the previous nonce value and generates a random nonce again. Therefore, because the frame is encrypted with previous nonce value, the received normal frame cannot be decrypted.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered on Sigma Design Z-Wave S0 through S2 devices. An attacker first prepares a Z-Wave frame-transmission program (e.g., Z-Wave PC Controller, OpenZWave, CC1110, etc.). Next, the attacker conducts a DoS attack against the Z-Wave S0 Security version product by continuously sending divided &amp;#34;Nonce Get (0x98 0x81)&amp;#34; frames. The reason for dividing the &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame is that, in security version S0, when a node receives a &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame, the node produces a random new nonce and sends it to the Src node of the received &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame. After the nonce value is generated and transmitted, the node transitions to wait mode. At this time, when &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; is received again, the node discards the previous nonce value and generates a random nonce again. Therefore, because the frame is encrypted with previous nonce value, the received normal frame cannot be decrypted.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2018-19983</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-p576-c9v5-5pvc</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p576-c9v5-5pvc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered on Sigma Design Z-Wave S0 through S2 devices. An attacker first prepares a Z-Wave frame-transmission program (e.g., Z-Wave PC Controller, OpenZWave, CC1110, etc.). Next, the attacker conducts a DoS attack against the Z-Wave S0 Security version product by continuously sending divided &amp;#34;Nonce Get (0x98 0x81)&amp;#34; frames. The reason for dividing the &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame is that, in security version S0, when a node receives a &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame, the node produces a random new nonce and sends it to the Src node of the received &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame. After the nonce value is generated and transmitted, the node transitions to wait mode. At this time, when &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; is received again, the node discards the previous nonce value and generates a random nonce again. Therefore, because the frame is encrypted with previous nonce value, the received normal frame cannot be decrypted.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered on Sigma Design Z-Wave S0 through S2 devices. An attacker first prepares a Z-Wave frame-transmission program (e.g., Z-Wave PC Controller, OpenZWave, CC1110, etc.). Next, the attacker conducts a DoS attack against the Z-Wave S0 Security version product by continuously sending divided &amp;#34;Nonce Get (0x98 0x81)&amp;#34; frames. The reason for dividing the &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame is that, in security version S0, when a node receives a &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame, the node produces a random new nonce and sends it to the Src node of the received &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; frame. After the nonce value is generated and transmitted, the node transitions to wait mode. At this time, when &amp;#34;Nonce Get&amp;#34; is received again, the node discards the previous nonce value and generates a random nonce again. Therefore, because the frame is encrypted with previous nonce value, the received normal frame cannot be decrypted.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p576-c9v5-5pvc</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>gsd-2018-19983</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2018-19983</link>
      <description>gsd-2018-19983</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2018-19983</guid>
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