https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 07:45:52 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2016-10142 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2016-10142 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2017-00860 cnvd-2017-00860 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2017-00860 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-88318 EUVD-2026-88318 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-88318 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2016-10142 <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2016-10142 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4jqq-7wwq-485f <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4jqq-7wwq-485f https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2016-10142 gsd-2016-10142 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2016-10142 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2017:0817 <p>kernel: race condition in the TLB flush logic kernel: double-free in usb-audio triggered by invalid USB descriptor kernel: scsi: aacraid: double fetch in ioctl_send_fib() kernel: Stack corruption while reading /proc/keys when gcc stack protector is enabled kernel: Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr doesn&#39;t clear the setgid bit kernel: net: Out of bounds stack read in memcpy_fromiovec kernel: Use after free in SCSI generic device interface kernel: Use after free in SCSI generic device interface (CVE-2016-9576 regression) kernel - IPV6 fragmentation flaw kernel: S_ISGD is not cleared when setting posix ACLs in tmpfs (CVE-2016-7097 incomplete fix)</p> <p>kernel: race condition in the TLB flush logic kernel: double-free in usb-audio triggered by invalid USB descriptor kernel: scsi: aacraid: double fetch in ioctl_send_fib() kernel: Stack corruption while reading /proc/keys when gcc stack protector is enabled kernel: Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr doesn&#39;t clear the setgid bit kernel: net: Out of bounds stack read in memcpy_fromiovec kernel: Use after free in SCSI generic device interface kernel: Use after free in SCSI generic device interface (CVE-2016-9576 regression) kernel - IPV6 fragmentation flaw kernel: S_ISGD is not cleared when setting posix ACLs in tmpfs (CVE-2016-7097 incomplete fix)</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2017:0817 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2016-10142 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-azure-fde, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: linux-azure-fde-5.15, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-gke, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-gkeop, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-raspi2 and 11 more</p> <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-azure-fde, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: linux-azure-fde-5.15, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-gke, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-gkeop, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: linux-raspi2 and 11 more</p> <p>An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2016-10142