https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 11:23:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2022-31127 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> nextauthjs next-auth</p> <p>NextAuth.js is a complete open source authentication solution for Next.js applications. An attacker can pass a compromised input to the e-mail [signin endpoint](https://next-auth.js.org/getting-started/rest-api#post-apiauthsigninprovider) that contains some malicious HTML, tricking the e-mail server to send it to the user, so they can perform a phishing attack. Eg.: `balazs@email.com, &lt;a href=&#34;http://attacker.com&#34;&gt;Before signing in, claim your money!&lt;/a&gt;`. This was previously sent to `balazs@email.com`, and the content of the email containing a link to the attacker&#39;s site was rendered in the HTML. This has been remedied in the following releases, by simply not rendering that e-mail in the HTML, since it should be obvious to the receiver what e-mail they used: next-auth v3 users before version 3.29.8 are impacted. (We recommend upgrading to v4, as v3 is considered unmaintained. next-auth v4 users before version 4.9.0 are impacted. If for some reason you cannot upgrade, the workaround requires you to sanitize the `email` parameter that is passed to `sendVerificationRequest` and rendered in the HTML. If you haven&#39;t created a custom `sendVerificationRequest`, you only need to upgrade. Otherwise, make sure to either exclude `email` from the HTML body or efficiently sanitize it.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> nextauthjs next-auth</p> <p>NextAuth.js is a complete open source authentication solution for Next.js applications. An attacker can pass a compromised input to the e-mail [signin endpoint](https://next-auth.js.org/getting-started/rest-api#post-apiauthsigninprovider) that contains some malicious HTML, tricking the e-mail server to send it to the user, so they can perform a phishing attack. Eg.: `balazs@email.com, &lt;a href=&#34;http://attacker.com&#34;&gt;Before signing in, claim your money!&lt;/a&gt;`. This was previously sent to `balazs@email.com`, and the content of the email containing a link to the attacker&#39;s site was rendered in the HTML. This has been remedied in the following releases, by simply not rendering that e-mail in the HTML, since it should be obvious to the receiver what e-mail they used: next-auth v3 users before version 3.29.8 are impacted. (We recommend upgrading to v4, as v3 is considered unmaintained. next-auth v4 users before version 4.9.0 are impacted. If for some reason you cannot upgrade, the workaround requires you to sanitize the `email` parameter that is passed to `sendVerificationRequest` and rendered in the HTML. If you haven&#39;t created a custom `sendVerificationRequest`, you only need to upgrade. Otherwise, make sure to either exclude `email` from the HTML body or efficiently sanitize it.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2022-31127