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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:44:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-27144 — Go JOSE's Parsing Vulnerable to Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-27144</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; go-jose&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. In versions on the 4.x branch prior to version 4.0.5, when parsing compact JWS or JWE input, Go JOSE could use excessive memory. The code used strings.Split(token, &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;) to split JWT tokens, which is vulnerable to excessive memory consumption when processing maliciously crafted tokens with a large number of `.` characters.  An attacker could exploit this by sending numerous malformed tokens, leading to memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service. Version 4.0.5 fixes this issue. As a workaround, applications could pre-validate that payloads passed to Go JOSE do not contain an excessive number of `.` characters.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; go-jose&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. In versions on the 4.x branch prior to version 4.0.5, when parsing compact JWS or JWE input, Go JOSE could use excessive memory. The code used strings.Split(token, &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;) to split JWT tokens, which is vulnerable to excessive memory consumption when processing maliciously crafted tokens with a large number of `.` characters.  An attacker could exploit this by sending numerous malformed tokens, leading to memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service. Version 4.0.5 fixes this issue. As a workaround, applications could pre-validate that payloads passed to Go JOSE do not contain an excessive number of `.` characters.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-27144</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf — gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: google.golang.org/grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` &amp;amp; `RequestedServerName` matchers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected Component: xDS RBAC 
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: google.golang.org/grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` &amp;amp; `RequestedServerName` matchers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected Component: xDS RBAC 
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf</guid>
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