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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 19:14:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2024-51744 — Bad documentation of error handling in ParseWithClaims can lead to potentially dangerous situations in golang-jwt</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-51744</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; golang-jwt jwt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in &amp;#34;dangerous&amp;#34; situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors (&amp;#34;dangerous&amp;#34; ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; golang-jwt jwt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in &amp;#34;dangerous&amp;#34; situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors (&amp;#34;dangerous&amp;#34; ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-51744</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf — gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: google.golang.org/grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` &amp;amp; `RequestedServerName` matchers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected Component: xDS RBAC 
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: google.golang.org/grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` &amp;amp; `RequestedServerName` matchers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected Component: xDS RBAC 
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf</guid>
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