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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-47912 — Insufficient validation of bracketed IPv6 hostnames in net/url</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-47912</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/url&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Parse function permits values other than IPv6 addresses to be included in square brackets within the host component of a URL. RFC 3986 permits IPv6 addresses to be included within the host component, enclosed within square brackets. For example: &amp;#34;http://[::1]/&amp;#34;. IPv4 addresses and hostnames must not appear within square brackets. Parse did not enforce this requirement.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/url&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Parse function permits values other than IPv6 addresses to be included in square brackets within the host component of a URL. RFC 3986 permits IPv6 addresses to be included within the host component, enclosed within square brackets. For example: &amp;#34;http://[::1]/&amp;#34;. IPv4 addresses and hostnames must not appear within square brackets. Parse did not enforce this requirement.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-47912</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg — ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two related paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the redirect target.
2. A blob upload `POST` authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload `Location` on another host or port. The follow-up `PUT` can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the `Location` target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The upload `Location` issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload `Location` fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions Tested&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `oras…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two related paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host or port. The redirected request can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the redirect target.
2. A blob upload `POST` authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload `Location` on another host or port. The follow-up `PUT` can carry the origin `Authorization` header to the `Location` target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The upload `Location` issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload `Location` fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions Tested&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `oras…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vh4v-2xq2-g5cg</guid>
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