https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:25:59 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2018-10237 <p>Unbounded memory allocation in Google Guava 11.0 through 24.x before 24.1.1 allows remote attackers to conduct denial of service attacks against servers that depend on this library and deserialize attacker-provided data, because the AtomicDoubleArray class (when serialized with Java serialization) and the CompoundOrdering class (when serialized with GWT serialization) perform eager allocation without appropriate checks on what a client has sent and whether the data size is reasonable.</p> <p>Unbounded memory allocation in Google Guava 11.0 through 24.x before 24.1.1 allows remote attackers to conduct denial of service attacks against servers that depend on this library and deserialize attacker-provided data, because the AtomicDoubleArray class (when serialized with Java serialization) and the CompoundOrdering class (when serialized with GWT serialization) perform eager allocation without appropriate checks on what a client has sent and whether the data size is reasonable.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2018-10237 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3244-j874-rhc2 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-redis</p> <p>### Summary An attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError.</p> <p>### Details io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisArrayAggregator aggregates RedisMessage parts into ArrayRedisMessage. It uses a `Deque&lt;AggregateState&gt;` to keep track of nested arrays. However, it does not limit the maximum depth of nested arrays. When an attacker sends a continuous stream of nested array headers (e.g., `*1\r\n*1\r\n*1\r\n...`), RedisArrayAggregator pushes a `new AggregateState` onto the stack and allocates a `new ArrayList` for each header. Because there is no depth limit, an attacker can send millions of such headers. This consumes a massive amount of heap memory for the AggregateState instances and their backing ArrayLists, eventually resulting in an OutOfMemoryError.</p> <p>### Impact Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty&#39;s RedisArrayAggregator to handle untrusted Redis traffic is vulnerable.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-redis</p> <p>### Summary An attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError.</p> <p>### Details io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisArrayAggregator aggregates RedisMessage parts into ArrayRedisMessage. It uses a `Deque&lt;AggregateState&gt;` to keep track of nested arrays. However, it does not limit the maximum depth of nested arrays. When an attacker sends a continuous stream of nested array headers (e.g., `*1\r\n*1\r\n*1\r\n...`), RedisArrayAggregator pushes a `new AggregateState` onto the stack and allocates a `new ArrayList` for each header. Because there is no depth limit, an attacker can send millions of such headers. This consumes a massive amount of heap memory for the AggregateState instances and their backing ArrayLists, eventually resulting in an OutOfMemoryError.</p> <p>### Impact Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty&#39;s RedisArrayAggregator to handle untrusted Redis traffic is vulnerable.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3244-j874-rhc2