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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xxph-c9ww-hj94 — Google Guava: CompactHashMap/CompactHashSet/MapMakerInternalMap deserialization triggers uncontrolled memory allocation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xxph-c9ww-hj94</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.google.guava:guava&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# CompactHashMap/CompactHashSet/MapMakerInternalMap native deserialization triggers uncontrolled memory allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CompactHashMap`, `CompactHashSet`, and `MapMakerInternalMap` implement `readObject(ObjectInputStream)` by reading an attacker-controlled `elementCount` or `initialCapacity` from the stream. On the very first insertion during or after deserialization (for the `CompactHash*` collections, inside `allocArrays()`) or immediately during deserialization (for `MapMakerInternalMap`), the implementation eagerly allocates arrays sized to that full, unvalidated value (up to `CompactHashing.MAX_SIZE` = 2^30-1, ~1.07 billion, for example) before the rest of the stream&amp;#39;s actual content has been consumed. A 72-byte malicious serialized stream containing a single tiny element can force a multi-gigabyte allocation and crash a JVM with `OutOfMemoryError`, dynamically confirmed against the current release.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CompactHashMap.readObject()` (`guava/src/com/google/common/collect/CompactHashMap.java`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream stream) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
  stream.defaultReadObject();
  int elementCount = stream.readInt();
  if (elementCount &amp;lt; 0) {
    throw new InvalidObjectException(&amp;#34;Invalid size: &amp;#34; + elementCount);
  }
  init(elementCount);
  for (int i = 0; i &amp;lt; elementCount; i++) {
    K key = (K) stream.readObject();
    V value = (V) stream.readObject();
    put(key, value);
  }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`elementCount` is onl…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.google.guava:guava&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# CompactHashMap/CompactHashSet/MapMakerInternalMap native deserialization triggers uncontrolled memory allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CompactHashMap`, `CompactHashSet`, and `MapMakerInternalMap` implement `readObject(ObjectInputStream)` by reading an attacker-controlled `elementCount` or `initialCapacity` from the stream. On the very first insertion during or after deserialization (for the `CompactHash*` collections, inside `allocArrays()`) or immediately during deserialization (for `MapMakerInternalMap`), the implementation eagerly allocates arrays sized to that full, unvalidated value (up to `CompactHashing.MAX_SIZE` = 2^30-1, ~1.07 billion, for example) before the rest of the stream&amp;#39;s actual content has been consumed. A 72-byte malicious serialized stream containing a single tiny element can force a multi-gigabyte allocation and crash a JVM with `OutOfMemoryError`, dynamically confirmed against the current release.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`CompactHashMap.readObject()` (`guava/src/com/google/common/collect/CompactHashMap.java`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream stream) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
  stream.defaultReadObject();
  int elementCount = stream.readInt();
  if (elementCount &amp;lt; 0) {
    throw new InvalidObjectException(&amp;#34;Invalid size: &amp;#34; + elementCount);
  }
  init(elementCount);
  for (int i = 0; i &amp;lt; elementCount; i++) {
    K key = (K) stream.readObject();
    V value = (V) stream.readObject();
    put(key, value);
  }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`elementCount` is onl…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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