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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 05:36:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-61726 — Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-61726</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/url, Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.3.1, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.4.0, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 10, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 and 152 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/url, Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.3.1, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.4.0, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 10, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 and 152 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-61726</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4v7x-pqxf-cx7m — net/http, x/net/http2: close connections when receiving too many headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4v7x-pqxf-cx7m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: net/http, Go: golang.org/x/net/http2, Go: golang.org/x/net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request&amp;#39;s headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: net/http, Go: golang.org/x/net/http2, Go: golang.org/x/net&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request&amp;#39;s headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4v7x-pqxf-cx7m</guid>
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